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The exclusion of arbitration from the scope of application of the Brussels Regime on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters in the EU has a long history and is still subject to controversy. After some intro-
ductory explanations of the legal framework and relevant principles in the field of law, 
this minor dissertation examines chronologically all possible involvements of national 
courts in arbitral proceedings in order to give an overview of the (in-) applicability of 
the Brussels Ia Regulation to them. For this purpose, the relevant case law of the CJEU 
and the related legal developments beginning with the adoption of the Brussels Conven-
tion up to the entry into force of the Brussels Ia Regulation are being considered. Final-
ly, the legal problems arising from the current state of affairs and how courts should 
navigate it are discussed with an emphasis on the possible enforcement constellations of 
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A. Introduction 
 In 1968, when the then six contracting parties to the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Economic Community concluded on the Brussels Convention they were anxious 
to strengthen the legal protection of persons established in their Community.1 At this 
point in time, a major part of legal protection for commercial parties – namely arbitra-
tion – was already excluded from the scope of application of this Convention.2 The rea-
son for this exclusion was mainly to be seen in a planned European Convention provid-
ing a uniform law on arbitration as well as in already existing international agreements 
on arbitration, especially the New York Convention from 1958 on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards3 (hereinafter New York Convention).4 In the 
course of time, the plans for a uniform law on arbitration seemed to have evaporated 
into thin air and it turned out that this simple explanation might not be able to sufficient-
ly provide for all the possible case constellations at the interface between proceedings in 
front of a national court and an arbitral tribunal. 
 This realisation was mainly supported by a growth of transnational disputes. 
First, arbitral proceedings have augmented massively since then and especially within 
the last 25 years.5 Second, with globalisation gaining more and more ground, cross-
border litigations in front of courts and the connected problems of jurisdiction and en-
forcement are generally increasing as well.6 The result of these two developments is a 
greater awareness among legal practitioners for the challenges arising from the interplay 
between the two dispute resolution mechanisms. Therefore, the harmonisation of legal 
bodies dealing with these challenges has been put forward in the European Union and 
beyond. With the inclusion of more and more countries first into the European Econom-
                                                            
1  Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (1968), Brussels, 27 September 1968, OJ L 299, 32. 
2  Art 1(4) Brussels Convention. 
3  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 
June 1958, 330 UNTS 38. 
4  P Jenard ‘Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters’ (1979) OJ C 59 13; L Hauberg Wilhelmsen ‘The Recast Brussels I 
Regulation and Arbitration: Revisited or Revised?’ (2014) 30 Arb. Int’l 172. 
5  S Menon QC ‘International Arbitration: The Coming of a New Age for Asia (and Elsewhere)’ 
ICCA Congress 2012 – Opening Plenary Session, 11 June 2012, para 3, available at 
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13398435632250/ags_opening_speech_icca_congress_ 
 2012.pdf, accessed on 10 August 2016. 
6  PJ Slot Globalisation and Jurisdiction 1ed (2004) 1. 
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ic Community and then the European Union, the European instruments are covering a 
larger territory. With the entry into force of the Brussels I Regulation in 2002 and the 
Brussels Ia Regulation in 2015,7 attempts to optimise the legal mechanisms dealing with 
jurisdiction of courts and the enforcement of their judgments have continued. 
 On a bigger stage and with regards to arbitration, after the success of the New 
York Convention, UNCITRAL has provided a Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration for national legislators in order to assist states in reforming and modernising 
their laws on arbitral procedure and thereby contributing significantly to an harmonisa-
tion of the practice of arbitration.8 
 This minor dissertation aims to provide an overview of the developments con-
cerning the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of application of the European Con-
vention and Regulations. The main question to be examined is which legal consequenc-
es result from the exclusion of “arbitration” from the scope of application in Art. 1(2)(d) 
Brussels Ia Regulation. In the course of the aforementioned, two subquestions will be 
discussed. First of all, it needs to be evaluated which arbitration-related matters are be-
ing covered by Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation, discussing in chronological order all 
possible involvements of national courts in arbitration proceedings. Second, the main 
legal problems that arise from the current state of affairs and how courts should navi-
gate it will be discussed. While doing so, the case law of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (CJEU) will be discussed as well as the implications of the recasted Brus-
sels Ia Regulation, which has been in force since 10 January 2015.9 
                                                            
7  Regulation (EU) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters of 22 December 2000 (Brussels I), 16 January 2001,OJ L 12, 1; 
and Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 De-
cember 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (Brussels Ia), 20 December 2012, OJ L 351, 1. 
8  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments as 
adopted in 2006, United Nations Publication Sales No. E.08.V.4, 2008, 1. 
9  Art 81(2) Brussels Ia Regulation. 
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I. Legal Framework 
 This minor dissertation focuses on EU law and arbitration law. The former con-
sists in this case mainly of the Brussels Regulations10 and the latter is dominated by the 
New York Convention and in minor parts by the Geneva Convention. Nevertheless, also 
the UNCITRAL Model Law will be considered, as it continues to give innovative im-
plications for national legislations, which themselves constitute one of the main legal 
sources with regards to arbitration. 
1. European Law 
a) The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union11 
 
 With the conclusion of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC),12 the then six Member States agreed that they ‘shall, so far as is necessary, 
enter into negotiations […][about] the simplification of formalities governing the recip-
rocal recognition and enforcement of judgements of courts or tribunals and of arbitra-
tion awards’.13 This was the legal basis for the 1968 Brussels Convention, which was 
not yet an instrument of the EEC itself, but rather an international convention that was 
negotiated in the same forum as EEC legislation.14 Therefore, a new version of the 
Brussels Convention had to be negotiated and concluded every time more states joined 
the EU, which led to several modifications over the years.15 
                                                            
10  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), 17 June 2008, OJ L 177, 1, also excludes 
arbitration (see Art. 1(2)(e)), so that the validity of the arbitration clause cannot fall under that 
Regulation. 
11  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 26 October 2012, OJ C 326, 1. 
12  Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11, 3. 
13  Art 220 subpara 4 Rome Treaty. 
14  T Kruger Civil Jurisdiction Rules of the EU and their Impact on Third States 1ed (2008) para 
1.06, with further references on the relationship between Art 220 Rome Treaty and the Brussels 
Convention. 
15  Kruger op cit (n14) para 1.10; the arbitration exclusion in Art 1 has always remained, so that 
these modifications do not affect this work.  
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 The following Treaty of Maastricht16 modified the Treaty of Rome significantly, 
but did not entail great changes regarding the legal basis of the Brussels Convention, as 
Art. 220 of the Rome Treaty was retained.17 
 It was with the Treaty of Amsterdam of 10 November 199718 that the compe-
tence to legislate on measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having 
cross-border implications was transferred from the Member States to the European 
Community.19 The legal basis for this competence was Art. 65 EC-Treaty (Amsterdam 
version), which contained in its first paragraph the predecessor of what was later to be-
come the legal basis of the Brussels Regulations.20 To this extent, the EC was able to 
enact Regulations in this area. As they apply directly in every Member State, no act of 
transposition within the national legislations was needed anymore.21 
 The Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 200722, later assigned the compe-
tence to harmonise the European civil procedure law from the EC to the EU. Title IV of 
the former Maastricht Treaty, providing for a gradual constitution of an area of freedom, 
security and justice, was transferred into Title V of the TFEU (Art. 67(1) TFEU).23 The 
central provision in this title with regards to the Brussels Regulations is Art. 81 TFEU, 
which provides in paragraph 1 for the development of judicial cooperation in civil mat-
ters having cross-border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of 
judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. This provision contains a broad com-
petence of the EU for legislative measures concerning cross-border disputes in order to 
ensure – among others – the proper functioning of the internal market.24 Nevertheless, 
Art. 81(2) TFEU limits this competence as it contains an exhaustive enumeration.25 The 
Brussels Regulations then find their specific legal basis in Art. 81(2)(a) TFEU, which 
                                                            
16  Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 29 July 1992, OJ C 191, 1. 
17  Kruger op cit (n14) para 1.11. 
18  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, Amsterdam, 10 November 1997, 
OJ C 340, 1. 
19  M Rossi ‘AEUV – Art. 81’ in EUV/AEUV – Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit 
Europäischer Grundrechtecharta – Kommentar 5ed (2016) para 1; T Kruger op cit (n14) para 
1.12. 
20  Rossi op cit (n19) para 18. 
21  Art 249(2) EC-Treaty, now Art 288(2) TFEU. 
22  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community, Lisbon, 17 December 2007, OJ C 306, 1. 
23  P Stone EU Private International Law 2ed (2010) 4; A Stadler ‘Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht’ 
in Zivilprozessordnung mit Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz 13ed (2016) Vorbemerkung para 2. 
24  B Hess ‘AEUV – Art 81’ in Das Recht der Europäischen Union 58ed (2016) para 2; Stadler op 
cit (n23) Vorbemerkung para 2; S Leible ‘AEUV – Art 81’ in EUV/AEUV 2ed (2012) para 5. 
25  Rossi op cit (n19) para 7, with further references. 
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expressly provides for the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States 
of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases.26 
b) The Brussels Ia Regulation  
 
 On the basis of the aforementioned, the EU has enacted the Brussels Ia Regula-
tion in 2015. As it is the latest of the subsequent legal tools dealing with jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, this pa-
per will focus on the provisions of this Regulation and only refer to the former versions 
where necessary. 
 Art. 1 Brussels Ia Regulation sets out the scope of application of the Regulation, 
which refers in paragraph one in general terms to civil and commercial matters. Of in-
terest in this context is Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation, which explicitly states that 
the Regulation shall not apply to arbitration and which was already part of the Brussels 
Convention since its first version.27 This seemingly simple exclusion is subject to poten-
tial controversy, as its scope was never clearly defined. Does the exclusion only extend 
to arbitration proceedings itself or also to public court proceedings in support of arbitra-
tion? And if the latter, which of these supporting proceedings are covered by the excep-
tion and which ones are not? Before as well as after the introduction of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation – as this minor dissertation will show – only the CJEU was and will be able 
to interpret the thereby created unpredictability. 
2. Arbitration Law 
 The practice of international arbitration is built on a complex framework of na-
tional and international law and in the last instance needs to be enforced by national 
courts.28 Only the continuing development of these laws enabled international arbitra-
tion to become what it is today. While the rules of arbitral institutions and the practice 
of experienced arbitration practitioners in general are a part of this regime,29 the inter-
face of arbitral and court proceedings happens mainly in the frame of the national arbi-
tration laws. These laws in turn often build on the New York Convention of 1958, the 
                                                            
26  Rossi op cit (n19) para 19. 
27  Art 1(2)(4) Brussels Convention. 
28  G Born International Commercial Arbitration 2ed (2014) 97. 
29  N Blackaby Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration 6ed (2015) para 1.224 subs. 
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1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration and the UN-
CITRAL Model Law, which itself has implemented and elaborated upon the New York 
Convention.30 
a) The New York Convention of 1958 
 
 When it comes to arbitration law one will first of all have to consider the New 
York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards as one of the cornerstones of international arbitration.31 The Convention cur-
rently has 156 parties, including all leading industrial nations and all EU Member 
States.32 With its introduction, for the first time in the history of international commer-
cial arbitration a comprehensive international legal framework for international arbitra-
tion agreements and arbitral awards was established.33  Confusion might arise from the 
title of the Convention, as it only refers to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards while it is in fact covering arbitration agreements as well.34 This is important 
with regards to jurisdictional matters, as they often arise from questions relating to the 
validity of an arbitration agreement. Thus, the scope covered by the Convention largely 
corresponds to the scope of the Brussels Regulation, which explains why it was neces-
sary to insert a provision about the interaction of the two instruments.35 
 Over the years, some difficulties with regards to the interpretation of some pro-
visions became apparent, which gave rise to a discussion about a revision of the New 
York Convention.36 But finding consensus among so many states would be a difficult 
task and a new convention would lead to a more complicated regime with the old and a 
new convention in force at the same time. Moreover, as the 1958 Convention in general 
has largely succeeded, a revision at the moment does not seem to be very likely or fa-
                                                            
30  Born op cit (n28) 99. 
31  Blackaby op cit (n29) para 1.211. 
32  UNCITRAL ‘Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York, 1958) – Status’ UNCITRAL, 2016, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html, ac-
cessed on 15 August 2016. 
33  Born op cit (n28) 103. 
34  Blackaby op cit (n29) para 1.212. 
35  See Art 73(2) Brussels Ia Regulation. 
36  A recasted version of the Convention has been proposed by AJ van den Berg ‘A closer look at 
the proposed ”New New York Convention”’ (2008) 3 G.A.R. 14. 
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vourable.37 Besides that, the UNCITRAL Model Law from the beginning on was also 
enacted in order to address some – if not all – of these difficulties38 and an additional 
‘[r]ecommendation regarding the interpretation of article II, paragraph 2, and article 
VII, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards’ has been drafted in 2006 in order to further contribute to a uniform 
interpretation of the New York Convention.39 
b) The Geneva Convention of 1961 
 
 In 1961, the Economic Commission of the UN adopted the European Conven-
tion on International Commercial Arbitration in Geneva (hereinafter European Conven-
tion) with the desire to promote the development of European trade and having noted 
the signing of the 1958 New York Convention.40 Back then, it was intended to support 
the trade between east and west in a divided Europe and signed by 16 states, while it 
now has 31 parties, 17 of them being Member States of the EU.41 In contrast to the New 
York Convention, the European Convention covers besides arbitration agreements and 
arbitral awards also the arbitral procedure.42 Nevertheless, the small number of parties 
to the 1961 Geneva Convention limits its relevance significantly, even though it con-
tains some important rules that other instruments in this field of law are lacking. 
c) UNCITRAL Model Law 
 
 Aside from the 1958 New York Convention, the other milestone in International 
Commercial Arbitration is the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law), which has been named the ‘most 
                                                            
37  E Gaillard ‘Is There a Need to Revise the New York Convention?’ (2008) 2 Disp. Resol. Int'l 
189. 
38  UNCITRAL ‘Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Volume 
X’ (1979) A/CN.9/168 108 para 49; UNCITRAL ‘Further work in respect of international com-
mercial arbitration’ (1979) A/CN.9/169 2 para 9. 
39  UNCITRAL ‘Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work 
of its thirty-ninth session’ (2006) A/61/17 61 subs. 
40  European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Geneva, 21 April 1961, 484 
U.N.T.S. 364. 
41  United Nations ‘European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration – Status’ United 
Nations, 2016, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-
2&chapter=22&clang=_en (2016), accessed on 11 September 2016. 
42  Born op cit (n28) 118. 
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important legislative instrument in the field of international commercial arbitration’.43 It 
is not a convention, but aims to support national legislators while (re-) modelling their 
national arbitration laws on a voluntary basis. While the New York Convention focuses 
on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards, the Model Law 
deals with the arbitral procedure from beginning to end.44 Nevertheless, where the two 
instruments overlap, the UNCITRAL Model Law adopts the provisions of the New 
York Convention. In general, it attempts to harmonise national arbitration legislations as 
far as possible in order to facilitate international commercial arbitration.45 
 After some years, some concerns arose especially with regards to the require-
ment for an arbitration agreement to be in writing and the power of the arbitral tribunal 
to order provisional measures, so that the original version of 1985 was amended in 2006 
in order to modernise the former text.46 Up until today, 72 states have adopted the Mod-
el Law in a total of 102 jurisdictions, among them 17 Member States of the EU.47  
d) National arbitration laws 
 
 All of the above-mentioned international legal instruments contribute to the 
creation of well-functioning national arbitration laws. Only if the national laws give 
effect to the fundamentally autonomous process of arbitration through the courts can the 
system succeed. As arbitration in general is excluded from the Brussels Ia Regulation, 
and no other uniform legal measure in this area has been enacted on a EU level, the im-
portance of the national arbitration laws within the EU is as high as elsewhere. The lack 
of harmonising measures within the EU leads to a variety of different arbitration laws 
among the Member States. Even though a majority of them have enacted national arbi-
tration laws on the basis of the Model Law, some of the major players (e.g. France, 
England, Sweden and the Netherlands) follow their own approaches.48 Further, the 
Member States, having adopted the Model Law, often depart from the original text 
where they deem it appropriate to do so. Therefore, an analysis of the national arbitra-
                                                            
43  Born op cit (n28) 134. 
44  Blackaby op cit (n29) para 1.219. 
45  Born op cit (n28) 135. 
46  Blackaby op cit (n29) para 1.220. 
47  UNCITRAL ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with 
amendments as adopted in 2006 – Status’ UNCITRAL, 2016,  available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.htm
l, accessed on 15 August 2016. 
48  Born op cit (n28) 139. 
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tion law at the seat of arbitration before choosing the forum is still highly advisable.49 
The role of national arbitration legislation thus still cannot be underestimated, while 
indeed the approach undertaken by UNCITRAL with the Model Law seems to be the 
only realistic attempt to harmonise the different sets of rules dealing with international 
arbitration worldwide. 
II. The principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
 The principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz50 deals with the power to decide juris-
diction, meaning the competence to decide the court’s or tribunal’s own competence to 
decide the case. There are two effects being attributed to the principle, namely its posi-
tive and its negative effect. The exact meaning of the principle still depends on the actu-
al national arbitration law and varies from country to country. Therefore, the term 
should be used with care.51 Nonetheless, it is helpful to outline the two most significant 
possible effects of the principle. 
1. Positive effect 
 The positive effect relates to the question whether the arbitral tribunal is allowed 
to rule on its own jurisdiction or not. Speaking in general terms, this question is almost 
always to be answered in the affirmative, as most modern national laws expressly pro-
vide for this power of the arbitral tribunal.52 In the Model Law, Art. 16(1) provides that 
‘[t]he arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction,[…]’. Such provisions are fore-
most designed to prevent abusive tactics and make the arbitral process more effective.53 
The arbitral tribunal’s power to rule on its own jurisdiction itself though does not neces-
sarily have an impact on the corresponding permission of a court to also decide the ju-
risdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Consequently, parallel proceedings remain possible. 
                                                            
49  As also recommended by UNCITRAL op cit (n47). 
50  The exact spelling varies from Kompetenz-Kompetenz over competence-competence to compé-
tence de la compétence, depending on the language of the author. 
51  Born op cit (n28) 1050. 
52  Blackaby op cit (n29) para 5.108. 
53  E Brengesjö ‘The pursuit of solutions to lis alibi pendens in international commercial arbitration’ 
(2014) 17(2) Int. A.L.R. 45. 
A. Introduction 13 
 
2. Negative effect 
 The exclusion of this capacity of national courts to decide jurisdictional objec-
tions against the arbitral tribunal until an arbitral award has been made constitutes the 
negative effect of the principle of Kompetenz Kompetenz.54 Thus, a judicial authority’s 
jurisdiction is excluded as soon as the arbitral tribunal has been seized of the case and 
can only intervene at the stage of the enforcement of the award, which often may be 
sought in a country different from the seat of the arbitration. Where provided, the effect 
is the most ambitious pro-arbitration rule because the possibility of national courts to 
scrutinise the arbitration agreement is limited as far as possible.55 Thereby, the danger 
of diverging decisions on jurisdiction is minimised,56 so that the negative effect of the 
principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz can be considered as a fully adequate lis pendens 
rule.57 In the European Convention, Art. VI(3) implies the negative effect of the princi-
ple,58 even though the last part of the paragraph allows national courts to consider juris-
dictional objections on an interlocutory basis if ‘they have good and substantial rea-
sons’.59 
 Often, a middle ground is followed that allows the arbitral tribunal to decide on 
its own jurisdiction while a public court may also do so, but not preventing the arbitral 
tribunal to continue its proceedings in the meantime. For example, Art. 8(2) Model Law 
states that arbitral proceedings may be commenced or continued and that even an award 
may be made despite the issue pending before a national court and thereby avoiding 
abuse of the proceedings before the national court. The New York Convention does not 
explicitly refer to the principle but implicitly allows both arbitral tribunals and national 
courts to decide jurisdictional disputes without clearly giving precedence to any of 
them.60 If such middle grounds are followed, parallel proceedings may emerge with the 
danger of diverging outcomes as a possibility. 
                                                            
54  Born op cit (n28) 1069. 
55  Brengesjö op cit (n53) 45 
56  G Carducci ‘The New EU Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and In-
ternational Arbitration’ (2013) 29 Arb. Int’l 482. 
57  L Hauberg Wilhelmsen ‘European Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration’ (2014) 
10(1) J. Priv. Int'l L. 115. 
58  Hauberg Wilhelmsen op cit (n57) 121. 
59  Born op cit (n28) 1058. 
60  Born op cit (n28) 1052 subs. 
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III. The consequence of an inclusion or exclusion of a subject-
matter from the Regulation 
 After these general considerations it can be recorded that, in general, the conse-
quence of the inclusion of a subject matter can be explained by referring to the main 
provisions of the Brussels Ia Regulation.  
 If a subject matter falls within the scope of the Regulation, these provisions ap-
ply. The jurisdiction of a court is determined by Art. 4 of the Brussels Ia Regulation, 
which in combination with the lis pendens mechanism of Art. 29 of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation provides for a high degree of predictability. Even more important, once a 
judgment has been made it benefits from the simplifications with regards to its recogni-
tion and enforcement, especially the absence of the need for an exequatur procedure 
according to Art. 39 Brussels Ia Regulation. 
 The second question is somewhat more difficult to answer. If the excluded sub-
ject matter is regulated by another EU Regulation, that Regulation applies, as it is for 
example the case with regards to matrimonial matters after Art. 1(2)(a).61 If no such 
instrument exists, it is the national law of each country that claims validity regarding the 
specific subject matter. The jurisdiction in disputes arising in the excluded area is gov-
erned by the national procedural rules, as is the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in this field of law. In principle, this applies according to Art. 1(2)(d) Brus-
sels Ia Regulation also to arbitration. Nevertheless, the national laws still may not in-
fringe basic principles of EU law,62 which potentially could lead to the necessity of re-
strictive interpretations regarding some provisions of national laws. Aside from the 
aforementioned, the variety of different court proceedings having a relation to arbitra-
tion leaves the way open for uncertainties regarding the scope of Art. 1(2)(d) of the 
Brussels Ia Regulation. 
                                                            
61  H Dörner ‘Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1215/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 12. 
Dezember 2012 über die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von 
Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen (Neufassung)’ in Zivilprozessordnung 6ed (2015) 
EuGVVO Art 1 para 8. 
62  See for example regarding the freedom of establishment Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og 
Selskabsstyrelsen (1999) Case No. C-212/97, E.C.R.I-01459; Überseering BV v. Nordic Con-
struction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) (2002) Case No. C-208/00, E.C.R. I-09919; 
Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd (2003) Case No. C-
167/01, E.C.R. I-10155; regarding the freedom of movement of persons Carlos Garcia Avello v. 
Belgian State (2003) Case No. C-148/02, E.C.R. I-11613; Grunkin and Paul v. Standesamt Nie-
büll (2006) Case No. C-353/06, E.C.R. I-07639. 
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B. Possible involvements of national courts in 
arbitral proceedings 
 I now turn to the question of which arbitration-related matters are covered by 
Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation and why (or why not) this is the case. For this pur-
pose, each possible involvement of national courts in arbitral proceedings will be exam-
ined chronologically. 
I. Challenges to the validity of the arbitration agreement 
 Even before the arbitral proceedings begin, when the dispute arises, one of the 
parties to an arbitration agreement may wish to challenge the agreement before a court. 
A first problem arising in this regard concerns the law applicable to the substantive va-
lidity of the arbitration agreement. 
 Art. II New York Convention requires national courts to recognize the validity 
of arbitration agreements and to refer the parties to arbitration. The provision does not 
indicate the substantive law governing the arbitration agreement, which is hindering the 
smooth functioning of court and arbitral proceedings in this context. Although Art. 
V(1)(a) of the New York Convention sets out that it is either the law chosen by the par-
ties, or failing such a choice the law of the seat of arbitration or the law as determined 
by the arbitral tribunal, which is applicable in this regard, the provision only applies at 
the stage of the enforcement of the award according to its wording.63 Therefore, differ-
ent legal bodies may apply different laws with regards to the substantive validity of the 
arbitration agreement, possibly leading to different results and diverging judgments on 
the merits.64 
 In the European Convention, Art. VI(2) sets out the criteria as to the substantive 
validity of the arbitration agreement in the same way as Art. V(1)(a) of the New York 
                                                            
63  Nevertheless, it is argued that the provision also applies at the stage of the enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement; see Born op cit (n28) 496 subs; Hauberg Wilhelmsen op cit (n57) 118 
subs, with further references. 
64  H van Houtte ’Why Not Include Arbitration in the Brussels Jurisdiction Regulation?’ (2005) 21 
Arb. Int’l 511. 
B. Possible involvements of national courts in arbitral proceedings 17 
 
Convention,65 but is not limiting the scope of application to the enforcement of the arbi-
tral award.66 In line with this, the provision adds a further criterion, being ‘the compe-
tent law by virtue of the rules of conflict of the court seized of the dispute’ at the pre-
award stage.67 Nevertheless, also this approach possesses legal uncertainties. The rules 
of conflict of different national courts may again lead to different competent laws being 
applicable to the substantive validity of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the risk of 
diverging judgments emerges also under the European Convention. 
 The UNCITRAL Model Law adopts Art. V(1)(a) of the New York Convention 
in Art. 36(1)(a)(i) for the enforcement of arbitral awards and extends its scope to setting 
aside proceedings in Art. 34(2)(a)(i).68 Nevertheless, as the approach is in general 
adopted from the New York Convention, the same reasoning regarding the law applica-
ble to the substantive validity of the arbitration agreement and the related legal uncer-
tainty applies to the UNCITRAL Model Law.69 
 This uncertainty regarding the substantive law being applicable to the validity of 
the arbitration agreement invites parties that are trying to escape the arbitral proceedings 
to challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement in different forums. If the possibil-
ity of different laws being applied in this regard exists, the possibility of different out-
comes also arises. 
 The party wishing to challenge the arbitration agreement may do so either by 
bringing the substantial claim(s) in front of a court as if no arbitration agreement existed 
so that the validity of the arbitration agreement becomes an incidental question, or by 
asking the court to rule on the validity of the arbitration agreement as the main subject 
matter. 
1. As an incidental question  
 A party having signed an arbitration agreement, but seeking to escape arbitration 
because it expects a national court to be more likely to rule in its favour or for other 
strategic reasons, will often try to start court proceedings regarding its substantial 
                                                            
65  Born op cit (n28) 502 subs. 
66  Hauberg Wilhemsen op cit (n57) 119. 
67  Art VI(2)(c) European Convention. 
68  Hauberg Wilhemsen op cit (n57) 119. 
69  Born op cit (n28) 527. 
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claim(s) or to obtain a negative declaration. Most likely, the counterparty will then 
lodge submissions to the effect that the court has no jurisdiction relying on the existence 
of the arbitration clause while commencing the arbitral proceedings at the same time. 
The court will then have to decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement as a pre-
liminary question in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction or not; and if it finds 
the arbitration agreement to be valid, it is only the arbitral tribunal which has jurisdic-
tion, so that the court will have to refer the parties to arbitration. On the contrary, where 
the court finds the arbitration agreement to be invalid, it could have jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the case. The question then becomes whether the Brussels Regime would 
be applicable in these cases or not.  
 The Schlosser Report on the Brussels Convention noted that different interpreta-
tions of Art. 1(4.) Brussels Convention were possible in these cases, but left open 
whether or not they were excluded.70 The later Kerameus Report was more concrete in 
this regard, stating that the verification of an arbitration agreement as an incidental 
question must be considered as falling within the scope of the Convention without giv-
ing further reasons for this view.71 
 The first time that the CJEU dealt with the matter was the case of Marc Rich.72 
Impianti, the allegedly liable party, filed an action for a negative declaration judgment 
in an Italian court. At the same time, Marc Rich, the opposing party, relied on the arbi-
tration agreement in these proceedings and started an action in order to appoint an arbi-
trator in the courts of the seat of arbitration (England) after Impianti had denied to take 
part in the arbitral proceedings. On appeal of the proceedings in order to appoint an ar-
bitrator, the case was referred to the CJEU in order to determine whether or not these 
proceedings in support of arbitration came within the scope of the Brussels Convention. 
Impianti thereby contended that the dispute in fact was not about the appointment of an 
arbitrator, but rather about the existence of the arbitration agreement, which in their 
opinion would not be excluded from the Convention and should therefore be considered 
by Italian courts. The CJEU ruled that with regards to the scope of the Convention, ref-
                                                            
70  Schlosser, Peter ‘Report on the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on ju-
risdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol 
on its interpretation by the Court of Justice’ (1979) OJ C 79, 5 March 1979, para 61, 62. 
71  KD Kerameus ‘Report on the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Community Convention 
on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters’ (1986) OJ C 
298, 24 November 1986, para 35. 
72  Marc Rich & Co AG v. Societa Italiana Impianti PA (1991) Case No. C-190/89, E.C.R. I-3855. 
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erence was only to be made to the main subject of the case because otherwise the prin-
ciple of legal certainty would be contradicted as the parties may raise preliminary ques-
tions at any time.73 In the Marc Rich case, the main subject matter was the appointment 
of the arbitrator whereas the validity of the arbitration agreement was only a preliminary 
issue. This indicated that the application of the Convention was excluded regarding the 
case in front of the English courts for the reason that the appointment of an arbitrator as 
the main subject of the case fell under Art. 1(4) of the Brussels Convention because ‘the 
appointment of an arbitrator by a national court is a measure adopted by the State as part 
of the process of setting arbitration proceedings in motion’.74 Therefore, the English 
courts, as they deemed the arbitration agreement to be valid, were able to proceed with 
the appointment of the arbitrator, notwithstanding the Italian Court having been seized 
first. 
 However, the aforementioned is only one side of the coin. Despite the English 
courts being able to proceed with the appointment of an arbitrator, the Italian courts also 
were able to proceed because the lis pendens rule of the Brussels Convention did not 
apply to the English proceedings (as they were not within the scope of the Convention). 
The Italian Courts were ruling (contrary to the English courts) that the arbitration 
agreement was invalid because they interpreted the requirement in Art. II of the New 
York Convention (that an arbitration agreement has to be in written form) narrower than 
the English courts so that they decided the case on its merits. The merits of the case 
were the non-liability of Impianti, which came within the scope of the Convention, so 
that the judgment on this matter fell within the scope of the Convention as well. The 
power to decide the preliminary question of the validity of the arbitration agreement 
thereby was not subject to the Brussels Convention, but rather a matter of the national 
law of the (in the given case Italian) court.75 As the preliminary question of the validity 
of the arbitration agreement was subject to national law, it was also possible that the 
Italian and English courts decided differently in this matter. This could have resulted in 
diverging decisions on the merits by the Italian court and a hypothetical arbitral tribunal 
                                                            
73  At para 26, 27. 
74  At para 19; see also below B.III. at p 34 subs. 
75  Marc Rich & Co AG v. Societa Italiana Impianti ‘Opinion of the Advocate General Darmon’ 
(1991) E.C.R. I-3855 at para 33, 44. 
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in England, even though the latter in fact seems not to have been constituted, as Marc 
Rich in the end entered into an argument on the substance in front of the Italian court.76  
 The principle, that reference is to be made to the main subject of the case in or-
der to determine the scope of application of the Convention, was confirmed in later arbi-
tration related decisions by the CJEU.77 In Van Uden, the Court specified that arbitra-
tion is the subject-matter of proceedings where the proceedings serve to protect the right 
to determine the dispute by arbitration.78 The incidental question of the validity of the 
arbitration agreement therefore does not affect the applicability of the Brussels Regime. 
This interpretation of Art. 1(4) Brussels Convention and Art. 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I 
Regulation respectively was in general accepted but at the same time a desire for solv-
ing the problem of potentially contradicting judgments and arbitral awards emerged.79 
 During the negotiations for the recast of the Brussels I Regulation, several solu-
tions were proposed, which emphasised the incidental question of the validity of the 
arbitration agreement and the danger of contradicting judgments resulting therefrom.80 
The first officially commissioned statement was the Heidelberg Report, which recom-
mended to either delete the exclusion while preserving the prevalence of the New York 
Convention or to (partly) include arbitration and thereby to admit exclusive jurisdiction 
to the courts of the seat of arbitration with regards to any supportive proceedings to ar-
bitration.81 The related Green Paper of the Commission on the Brussels I Regulation 
                                                            
76  TC Hartley ‘The Brussels I Regulation and arbitration’ (2014) 63 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 847; O 
Lando ‘Being First. On Uses and Abuses of the Lis Pendens under the Brussels Convention’ in 
Modern Issues in European Law: Nordic Perspectives : Essays in Honour of Lennart Pêalsson 
1ed (1997) 109. 
77  Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line v. Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma 
Deco-Line (1998) Case No. C-391/95, E.C.R. I-7091 at para 31, 33, 34; Allianz SpA and Gen-
erali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. West Tankers Inc. (2009) Case No. C-185/07, E.C.R. I-
00663 at para 22; "Gazprom" OAO v. Lietuvos Respublika (2015) Case No. C-536/13, Celex-Nr. 
62013CJ0536 at para 29; even though the court itself did not make a statement in this regard, be-
cause it did ‘not have sufficient information at its disposal in order to provide a useful answer’ 
(para 58), the AG reiterated this principle at para 98 in his opinion to Cartel Damage Claims 
(CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v. Evonik Degussa GmbH and others (2015) Case No. C-352/13, 
not yet published. 
78  Van Uden supra (n77) at para 33. 
79  DT Hascher ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments on the Existence and Validity of an 
Arbitration Clause under the Brussels Convention’ (1997) 13 Arb. Int’l 61; JJ van Haersolte-Van 
Hof ‘The Arbitration Exception in the Brussels Convention - Further Comment’ (2001) 18(1) J. 
Int’l Arb. 37; C Ambrose ‘Arbitration and the Free Movement of Judgments’ (2003) 19(1) Arb. 
Int’l 13; Van Houtte op cit (n64) 513. 
80  For a brief overview, see B Den Tandt ‘The Recast oft he Brussels I Regulation and Arbitration: 
Mission accomplished?’ (2015) 21(1) Colum. J. Eur. L. 95. 
81  B Hess, T Pfeiffer and P Schlosser The Brussels I Regulation 44/2001 – Application and En-
forcement in the EU 1ed (2008) para 131 subs. 
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seemed to support the latter recommendation of the Heidelberg Report.82 A rather mod-
erate approach was then taken by the Commission’s proposal, providing for a lis pen-
dens rule with regards to the validity of the arbitration agreement only, giving exclusive 
jurisdiction to the courts of a Member State being the seat of arbitration.83  
 The turning point in the discussion seemed to be an adverse Report released al-
ready before to the European Parliament, which stated in contrary to the above-
mentioned proposals that the exclusion of arbitration should in general remain, whereby 
a clarification of this exclusion in the form of a recital should be adopted.84 On this ba-
sis, the Council thereafter adopted its General Approach disregarding the propositions 
of the Commission and for the first time introducing a footnote that was later to become 
Recital 12 of the Brussels Ia Regulation.85 After some further consultations,86 the Euro-
pean Parliament eventually adopted the final version of the Brussels Ia Regulation on 
December 12, 2012.  
 Regarding the interface between arbitration and the Brussels Ia Regulation in 
general, a new Recital 12 and a new Art. 73(2) have been added, while the exclusion of 
arbitration as set out in Art. 1(2)(d) remained.87 Regarding the preliminary question of 
the validity of the arbitration agreement, these changes indicate some clarifications, but 
they do not seem to be able to effectively tackle the problem of parallel proceedings.  
                                                            
82  Commission of the European Communities ‘Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters’ (2009) COM(2009) 175 final, 21 April 2009, 9; for critical comments 
on this proposal see P Pinsolle ‘The proposed reform of Regulation 44/2001: a poison pill for ar-
bitration in the EU?’ (2009) 12(4) Int. A.L.R. 62; LG Radicati Di Brozolo ‘Arbitration and the 
Draft Revised Brussels I Regulation- Seeds of Home Country Control and of Harmonisation?’ 
(2011) 7(3) J. Priv. Int'l L. 433. 
83  European Commission ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial mat-
ters (Recast)’ (2010) COM(2010) 748 final, 14 December 2010, 36. 
84  European Parliament ‘Report on the Implementation and Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters’ (2010) EUR. PARL. Doc. 2009/2140 (INI), 29 June 2010, 8. 
85  Council of the European Union ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commer-
cial matters (Recast) -  First reading - General approach’ (2012) 2010/0838 (COD), JUSTCIV 
209, CODEC 1495, 1 June 2012, 61. 
86  European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs ‘Amendment 121, Draft Report Tadcusz 
Zwiefka’ (2012) 2010/0383(COD), PE 467.046v0 1-00, 25 September 2012, 1; European Par-
liament ‘Position of the European Parliament, adopted at first reading on 20 November 2012 
with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No .../2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters (Recast)’ (2012) EP-PETC I-COD(2010)0383, 20 November 2012, 1. 
87  With regards to the legal nature of recitals in EU regulations see Carducci op cit (n56) 470. 
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 Recital 12 of the Brussels Ia Regulation refers to this matter in its paragraphs 1, 
2 and 3. Paragraph 1 reiterates the arbitration exclusion and the prevalence of Art. II(3) 
New York Convention. The very last part of the paragraph thereby underlines the im-
portance of the national arbitration legislation of each Member State, referring the 
courts with regards to jurisdiction in arbitration-related matters and the examination of 
the validity of the arbitration agreement to their national law.88 It is therefore made 
clear, that a lis pendens rule for arbitration related matters, and especially with regards 
to the validity of the arbitration agreement as a preliminary question, is not included in 
the Regulation.89 Paragraph 2 then states that a decision about the validity of an arbitra-
tion agreement given by a court of a Member State should not be subject to the rules of 
the Regulation, ‘regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or as 
an incidental question’. Paragraph 3 takes up the issue once again, providing for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments on the merits that have decided about the 
invalidity of the arbitration agreement as a preliminary question in accordance with the 
Regulation. 
 This pictures the case of the Italian Courts in Marc Rich, so that the decision in 
this case would be the same under the Brussels Ia Regulation. Nevertheless, one clarifi-
cation results from the interplay between Recital 12(2) and (3): 
 The Brussels I Regulation and the jurisprudence of the CJEU left space for a 
court decision on the preliminary issue of the invalidity of the arbitration agreement to 
benefit from the Regulation’s enforcement regime if only the main subject matter of the 
case came within the scope of the Regulation. The reasons for this are first that the 
Brussels I Regulation itself did not yet specifically refer to this situation. Second, the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU supports this view. In Marc Rich, it ruled only that in the 
case of a judgment not being within the scope of the Regulation by virtue of its main 
subject-matter, ‘the existence of a preliminary issue which the court must resolve in 
order to determine the dispute cannot, whatever that issue may be, justify application of 
the Convention’.90 The judgment did not contain a statement regarding the reverse situa-
tion, where the main subject-matter of the case does come within the scope of the Regu-
lation; therefore, it was left open, if in this case, the preliminary decision on the inva-
                                                            
88  Carducci op cit (n56) 471. 
89  T Linna ‘The protection of arbitration agreements and the Brussels I Regulation’ (2016) 19(3) 
Int. A.L.R. 72. 
90  Marc Rich supra (n72) at para 26. 
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lidity of the arbitration agreement would be able to benefit from the Brussels I Regula-
tion’s enforcement regime in the same way as the judgment on the substance of the mat-
ter. But this situation was subject to the decision of the CJEU in the later West Tankers 
case.91 Therein, the Grand Chamber ruled  
‘that, if, because of the subject-matter of the dispute, […] proceedings come 
within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, a preliminary issue concerning the 
applicability of an arbitration agreement, including in particular its validity, also 
comes within its scope of application’.92 
 Accordingly, a preliminary decision on the (in-) validity of the arbitration 
agreement by a Member State court came within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation 
as long as the main subject-matter of the dispute did come within the scope of the Brus-
sels I Regulation.  
 By contrast, Recital 12 now splits the judgment into the principal decision on the 
substance of the matter and the preliminary decision on the invalidity of the arbitration 
agreement.93 Also in this situation, the latter ‘should not be subject to the rules of 
recognition and enforcement laid down in this Regulation’ according to Recital 12(2); 
therefore, it is made clear that a ruling on the invalidity of an arbitration agreement – 
may it be as a preliminary question or not – can never benefit from the Regulation’s 
enforcement regime. 
 Aside from the aforementioned, Recital 12(3) states in its last sentence also that 
the New York Convention ‘takes precedence over this Regulation’, which confirms the 
tenor of Art. 73(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. This could have implications for the 
handling of the situation in which a national court and an arbitral tribunal rule on the 
same subject matter.94 
 After all, a court judgment dealing with the validity of an arbitration agreement 
as an incidental question is covered by the exclusion of Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia Regula-
tion regarding the incidental decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement. This 
                                                            
91  West Tankers supra (n77); the decision is being presented in more detail below under B.II.1 at p 
26 subs. 
92  At para 26. 
93  M Illmer ‘Scope and Definitions – Arts 1, 3’ in The Brussels I Regulation Recast 1ed (2015) 
para 2.55; SP Camilleri ‘Recital 12 of the Recast Regulation: A New Hope?’ (2013) Int’l & 
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82(2) Arbitration 126; F De Ly 'The Interface between Arbitration and the Brussels Regulation’ 
(2015-2016) 5 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 505 subs. 
94  See below under C.II.2 at p 50 subs. 
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is based on the fact that it is initially Art. II(3) of the New York Convention providing 
that in principle the court ‘[…] shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties 
to arbitration, […]’ and thereby declining jurisdiction for the national court in favour of 
the arbitral tribunal. In this case, it is the national arbitration laws of the Member States 
(based on the New York Convention or directly referring to it) being applicable. Only 
where the court ‘finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable 
of being performed’, the New York Convention leaves space for jurisdiction of the na-
tional court regarding the main subject-matter. As the New York Convention itself does 
not set out any rules for the case of a national court finding the arbitration agreement to 
be invalid, other instruments of law have to apply in this case. After the above examina-
tions, if the national court of a Member State of the European Union finds the arbitra-
tion agreement to be invalid, this instrument of law would be the Brussels Ia Regula-
tion, governing both the jurisdiction of the court and the enforcement of its judgment on 
the merits, regardless the incidental ruling on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement. 
However, the incidental decision on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement does not 
benefit from the enforcement regime of the Brussels Ia Regulation and therefore does 
not bind the courts of other Member States. 
2. As the main subject matter of the dispute 
 In comparison to the foregoing, a dispute in front of a court dealing with the 
validity of the arbitration agreement as the main subject matter seems to be the excep-
tion. Indeed, the international effectiveness of declaratory judgments on the validity of 
the arbitration agreement has been named to be ‘largely theoretical as there are no 
known litigations or problems in the field’.95 
 Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Schlosser Report already stated in this 
regard that ‘a judgment determining whether an arbitration agreement is valid or not 
[…] is not covered by the 1968 Convention’.96 The principle set out by the CJEU, that 
regarding the scope of the Regulation reference is to be made to the main subject of the 
case, also leads to the conclusion that such cases would fall under the Art. 1(2)(d) ex-
ception of the Brussels Ia Regulation, because the validity of the arbitration agreement 
is directly linked to arbitration in general. A reason for this may be seen in the aim of 
                                                            
95  Hascher op cit (n79) 42; in the same sense AG Darmon supra (n75) at para 76. 
96  Schlosser op cit (n70) para 64. 
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protecting proceedings in support of arbitration at the seat of arbitration by reason of 
their neutrality.97 The new Recital 12 in the Brussels Ia Regulation further supports this 
result, as paragraph 2 explicitly provides for this interpretation; therefore, judgments 
dealing with the validity of the arbitration agreement as the main subject matter of the 
case are covered by the exclusion of Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation so that these 
proceedings are subject to the national law of the Member States.98  Notwithstanding 
this, a declaratory judgment on the validity of an arbitration agreement could neverthe-
less prevent the enforcement of a court judgment on the merits from another EU Mem-
ber State, in which this court considered the arbitration agreement to be ineffective.99 
II. Anti-suit injunctions in support of arbitration 
 Once the arbitration agreement has been found to be valid by a court or an arbi-
tral tribunal, English law provides the possibility to issue an anti-suit injunction in order 
to protect the jurisdiction of the forum determined by the arbitral agreement.100 Anti-suit 
injunctions prevent parties from bringing suit in a different court. Failing to respect the 
injunction would constitute contempt of court with the related consequence of a fine or 
other disciplinary measures,101 which can be described as the most aggressive way of 
avoiding parallel proceedings.102 Anti-suit injunctions were originally invented as 
weapons of the courts of equity in their battle against the courts of common law and 
spread from England to other common law jurisdictions, where they are still used more 
widely than anywhere else.103 It is an in personam order in relation to which the court 
(or the arbitral tribunal) has discretion,104 which is severely restricted if an arbitration 
agreement exists.105 
                                                            
97  AG Darmon supra (n75) at para 76. 
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 Cross-border anti-suit injunctions are critical with regards to the doctrine of 
comity as they affect the sovereignty and independence of foreign courts.106 Even 
though sanctions can only be imposed on the party disregarding the injunction and not 
on a foreign court itself, the threat of the sanction prevents the party from commencing 
proceedings in a foreign court so that it cannot decide its own jurisdiction in the first 
place.107 Anti-suit injunctions can be issued by courts and arbitral tribunals, whereby 
arbitral anti-suit orders serve the same purpose as anti-suit injunctions issued by 
courts.108 
 With regards to the Brussels Regime, the question is not whether anti-suit in-
junctions in support of arbitration are excluded from the scope of application according 
to Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation as being arbitration related, but rather whether 
they are compatible with the Brussels Regime in general. The reason for a possible in-
compatibility is to be seen in the principle of mutual trust, which imposes on the courts 
of the Member States the obligation to trust each other’s legal systems. This principle 
goes further than comity because it does not only require respect for each other by the 
courts of the Member States, but rather blind trust.109 
 As national courts and arbitral tribunals are governed by different legal instru-
ments, it seems to be favourable to distinguish between the two different instances issu-
ing anti-suit injunctions. 
1. By a national court 
 A national court may issue an anti-suit injunction in support of arbitration in 
order to prevent a party from making use of dilatory tactics before the arbitral tribunal 
has been constituted. This may be done by initialising court proceedings on the merits 
disregarding an arbitration agreement either before or after the opposing party has 
commenced arbitral proceedings based on the arbitration agreement. As the United 
                                                            
106  Kruger op cit (n14) para 5.151; G Carducci ‘Notes on the EUCJ’s ruling in Gazprom: West 
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Kingdom acceded to the EEC only on 1 January 1973, the problems with the Brussels 
Regime that can arise in this situation emerged rather slowly.  
 In line with the aforementioned, the reports on the Brussels Convention did not 
yet address the admissibility of anti-suit injunctions under the Convention.  
 English courts had considered the Convention as generally not excluding the 
possibility of anti-suit injunctions in several cases,110 until the CJEU had the opportuni-
ty to rule on this matter in Turner v Grovit.111 This case did not relate to arbitration, as 
the purpose of the anti-suit injunction was to protect proceedings in front of English 
courts and not in front of an arbitral tribunal. Therein, it was the first time that the CJEU 
ruled that granting an anti-suit injunction was not compatible with the Brussels Conven-
tion as it precluded the addressed court of a Member State indirectly from deciding it-
self about its own jurisdiction, which was incompatible with the principle of mutual 
trust that the Convention is based on. However, this reasoning did not necessarily mean 
that anti-suit injunctions by English courts against courts of other Member States in 
order to protect arbitral proceedings were inadmissible as well, because one could argue 
that they serve to protect the right to determine the dispute by arbitration in accordance 
with the Van Uden Case,112 which was already decided by the time the decision in 
Turner v Grovit was made.  
 The admissibility of anti-suit injunctions in support of arbitration was the sub-
ject-matter of the referral to the CJEU in the West Tankers case.113 Allianz and Generali 
Assicurazioni were insuring Erg and wanted to recover the sums they had paid to West 
Tankers in front of an Italian court. The reason for this was the collision of a vessel 
owned by West Tankers and chartered by Erg with a jetty owned by the latter in Italy. 
The charterparty between West Tankers and Erg included a clause providing for arbitra-
tion in London. Relying on the arbitration agreement, West Tankers sought in parallel 
proceedings a declaration by the High Court of Justice that the dispute was to be settled 
by arbitration as well as an anti-suit injunction restraining the insurance companies from 
continuing the proceedings in Italy. After the High Court had ruled in favour of West 
Tankers and the insurance companies appealed against that judgment, the House of 
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Lords referred the question to the CJEU whether it was ‘consistent with Regulation No 
44/2001 for a court of a Member State to make an order to restrain a person from com-
mencing or continuing proceedings in another Member State on the ground that such 
proceedings are in breach of an arbitration agreement.’114 First, the CJEU reiterated the 
findings from Marc Rich and Van Uden, drawing the logical conclusion that 
‘[p]roceedings, such as those in the main proceedings, which lead to the making of an 
anti-suit injunction, cannot, therefore, come within the scope of Regulation No 
44/2001’.115 Notwithstanding this, the Court found the anti-suit injunction to be incon-
sistent with the Brussels I Regulation.116 It based this conclusion on the finding that 
even though the proceedings did not come within the scope of the Regulation, they may 
nevertheless undermine its effectiveness by preventing the court of another Member 
State from exercising its jurisdiction conferred on it by the Regulation.117 Therefore, 
when it comes to the admissibility of anti-suit injunctions, reference was to be made to 
the subject-matter of the proceedings that the injunction aimed on preventing, in the 
given case being the ceded claims of Erg for damages that the insurance companies 
claimed for in front of the Italian courts. As stated above, the preliminary question of 
the validity of an arbitration agreement does not prevent a judgment on the merits from 
falling within the scope of application of the Regulation,118 so that the Italian proceed-
ings in West Tankers also had to be considered as falling therein. Therefore, the anti-suit 
injunction prevented the Italian courts from exercising jurisdiction in accordance with 
Art. 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation. Thus, the possibility of English courts to issue 
anti-suit injunctions in support of arbitration in the sense of a prevention of parallel pro-
ceedings before the national court of a Member State and an arbitral tribunal were 
scotched by the judgment.  
 This result encountered strong criticism, as it defeated a valid option for English 
courts to resolve the problem of parallel proceedings or torpedo actions at an early 
stage.119 In the review process, the Heidelberg Report, which was published before the 
judgment in the West Tankers case, stated that the future of anti-suit injunctions de-
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pended on the ruling of the CJEU in this case. But according to it, a party relying on an 
arbitration agreement would be better protected in any case if arbitration were included 
in the Regulation and the courts at the place of arbitration had exclusive jurisdiction. 
This would be because a decision confirming the validity of the arbitration agreement 
by the court at the place of arbitration would be recognised by the courts of other Mem-
ber States and prevent them from hearing the case on the merits.120 Schlosser later con-
firmed this reasoning after the judgment had been rendered.121 The Green Paper and the 
following Proposal by the Commission did not specifically refer to anti-suit injunctions, 
but as they largely referred to the solution of the Heidelberg Report, the same argument 
would have applied and met at least in parts approval.122 
 The European Parliament’s adverse Report, which was published after the judg-
ment in West Tankers was rendered, took a stand for a return to the status quo before the 
judgment, meaning that anti-suit injunctions to protect the arbitral jurisdiction should 
continue to be available as long as they were in conformity with the free movement of 
persons and fundamental rights.123 After that Report, the new Recital 12 was already 
introduced into the process of recasting the Brussels I Regulation in the way it was later 
adopted.124 
 The relevance of Recital 12 of the Brussels Ia Regulation with regards to the 
admissibility of anti-suit injunctions in support of arbitration is controversial. Some 
statements argue that the new recital would allow again for the issuing of anti-suit in-
junctions in support of arbitration,125 which would be in accordance with the demand of 
the first Report of the European Parliament. This view was also supported by Advocate 
General Wathelet in his opinion on the later Gazprom case.126  As this case actually 
dealt with anti-suit injunctions given by an arbitral tribunal, the judgment is discussed in 
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the next section.127 But the opinion given by Wathelet is also relevant regarding anti-suit 
injunctions issued by national courts. He stated that in the West Tankers case, the power 
of the English court to issue the anti-suit injunction would not have been affected under 
the recast Regulation, because Recital 12(2) now states that a ruling given by a court of 
a Member State as to the validity of the arbitration agreement should not come within 
the scope of the Regulation, regardless of whether it decided on this as a principal issue 
or as an incidental question, as it was the case in the targeted proceedings in Italy. Ac-
cording to Wathelet, Recital 12(3) would exclusively apply to the judgment on the sub-
stance of the case once the court had determined that the arbitration agreement was in-
valid. Until then, the issuing of an anti-suit injunction would have been possible, be-
cause the Italian case did not (yet) come within the scope of the Regulation, whereas 
once this decision was made, it would. Aside from the aforementioned, he referred to 
the legislative history and of course especially to the mentioned Report of the European 
Parliament and to Recital 12(4), according to which the Regulation shall not apply to 
‘ancillary proceedings’, which would include, in his opinion, court-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions. 
 It has been stated that this reasoning overlooks that Recital 12 only refers to the 
rules of recognition and enforcement and not also to jurisdictional matters laid down in 
the Regulation and thereby is not completely excluding rulings on the validity of arbi-
tration agreements from the scope of the Regulation, so that West Tankers still is in ef-
fect.128  
 Notwithstanding the aforementioned point, in my opinion, Wathelet’s separation 
of the very same case into two parts seems to be the result of an overinterpretation of 
Recital 12. The splitting in terms of time of a legal case with regards to its exclusion 
from the scope of the Regulation appears to be against common practice and would lead 
to an even stronger run to the courts. It would depend on the time needed by the (in 
West Tankers Italian) court to decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement for 
how long English courts would be able to prevent the next step in these proceedings by 
issuing an anti-suit injunction.  This would undermine the aim of legal certainty. Ac-
cording to my understanding, Recital 12(2) and (3) have to be read together. This means 
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that in the case of the validity of the arbitration agreement being a preliminary question, 
it depends on the answer to this question whether or not the judgment falls within the 
scope of the Regulation. If the court finds the arbitration agreement to be valid, the pro-
ceedings in front of this court are finished and its judgment does not fall within the 
scope of the Regulation in accordance with Recital 12(2). If the court finds the arbitra-
tion agreement to be invalid, it may go on with its proceedings leading to a judgment on 
the merits of the case, which then falls within the scope of the Regulation in accordance 
with Recital 12(3). Indeed, Recital 12(2) separates the incidental decision on the inva-
lidity of the arbitration agreement regarding its recognition and enforcement from the 
decision on the substance of the case. This, however, only means that other Member 
State courts are not bound by the incidental decision on the invalidity of the arbitration 
agreement, and not that the entire proceedings do not come within the scope of the Reg-
ulation until this decision is made. Otherwise, the merely alleged existence of a valid 
arbitration agreement would enable a party to attack the court proceedings with an anti-
suit injunction until the court has found that in fact no arbitration agreement exists. 
Therefore, the solution presented by Wathelet does not convince and appears to aim on 
artificially re-establishing the pursued status quo before the West Tankers decision. 
 Consistent to the aforementioned, the prevailing view is that Recital 12 does not 
have any implications as to whether or not anti-suit injunctions by national courts in 
support of arbitration are admissible, so that national courts would not be able to issue 
anti-suit injunctions in aid of arbitration under the recast Regulation.129 The basic reason 
for this may be that the principle of mutual trust still governs the Brussels Ia Regula-
tion.130  
 Ultimately, again only the CJEU will be able to decide on the permissibility of 
anti-suit injunctions by national courts under the Brussels Ia Regulation. But as the fu-
ture of the relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom is very uncertain after 
the vote for a Brexit, the CJEU may not even have to consider this issue anymore. If the 
Brexit would mean that Great Britain would no longer be part of the Brussels Regime, 
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they would no longer have to trust European courts either. Thus, the anti-suit injunction 
would again be at the disposal of English courts, even where the targeted proceedings 
would take place in a Member State. But this, of course, would not anymore have any-
thing to do with the Regulation.131 
2. By an arbitral tribunal 
 Depending on the arbitration rules, the arbitral tribunal might also itself render 
an anti-suit injunction in the form of an award once it has been set up, and thereby pre-
venting the parties from following their interests elsewhere. The English Arbitration 
Act, in section 48, contains an express provision concerning the remedies an arbitrator 
can order, stating that ‘[t]he tribunal has the same powers as the court to order a party to 
do or refrain from doing anything’.132 Under this provision, the arbitral tribunal is al-
lowed to issue anti-suit injunctions in order to protect its proceedings.133 While this pro-
vision would in principle first of all require that English arbitration law apply to the 
proceedings, it is generally accepted that arbitral tribunals have regardless of the appli-
cable arbitration law the power to order the remedies contained in section 48 of the Eng-
lish Arbitration Act.134 The legal basis for this power has been derived from the princi-
ple of kompetenz-kompetenz in arguing that the arbitral tribunal, having jurisdiction to 
rule about its own competence, must also be enabled to decide disputes about the arbi-
tration agreement and to sanction breaches thereof.135 A further reason may be seen in 
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the arbitrator’s obligation to take all the necessary measures to protect the future 
award.136  
 The Brussels Regime only governs the jurisdiction of national courts and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Arbitral proceedings in general and there-
fore also the ones concerned with anti-suit injunctions are not addressed there, so that an 
incompatibility could only occur at the later stage of the enforcement of the arbitral 
award, because it is only then that national courts become part of the process. As this 
work aims on giving an overview of possible court involvements in arbitration proceed-
ings chronologically, this issue would normally have to be dealt with at a later stage.137 
It is only because of some misunderstandings triggered by the West Tankers decision 
that arbitral anti-suit injunctions can reasonably be discussed here. 
 It was only after the West Tankers decision that the case of "Gazprom" OAO v. 
Lietuvos Respublika drew the attention to this matter.138 In this case, the Republic of 
Lithuania started proceedings in front of the courts of Lithuania, seeking initiation of an 
investigation in respect of allegedly improper activities of the board of directors of Gaz-
prom, a company with which they had concluded a shareholder agreement including an 
arbitral clause. Relying on this clause, Gazprom initiated arbitral proceedings in Stock-
holm where it claimed inter alia that the arbitral tribunal should order the Republic of 
Lithuania to discontinue the proceedings pending in Lithuania. The award was rendered 
accordingly and Gazprom applied for its enforcement to the court where the Lithuanian 
proceedings were pending. The case made its way up to the Supreme Court of Lithua-
nia, which referred the question to the CJEU ‘whether Regulation No 44/2001 must be 
interpreted as precluding a court of a Member State from recognising and enforcing, or 
from refusing to recognise and enforce, an arbitral award prohibiting a party from bring-
ing certain claims before a court of that Member State’.139 It assumed that this could be 
possible because ‘an arbitral award prohibiting a party from bringing certain claims be-
fore a national court could undermine the practical effect of Regulation No 44/2001’,140 
and thereby basically referring to the West Tankers decision. The court reiterated the 
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basic principles of its rulings in Marc Rich and West Tankers141 before highlighting the 
main difference between the case present before it and West Tankers: While in West 
Tankers the instance issuing the anti-suit injunction was a national court, in Gazprom an 
arbitral tribunal rendered an award containing the anti-suit injunction.142 Because of this 
difference in the instance issuing the injunction, the Court found that there was no con-
flict under the Brussels I Regulation, which governed only jurisdictional conflicts be-
tween national courts. Therefore, the principle of mutual trust could not have been in-
fringed. Moreover, the court stated that the party being faced with the injunction could 
contest the enforcement of the award, so that ‘the court seized would have to determine, 
on the basis of the applicable national procedural law and international law, whether or 
not the award should be recognised and enforced’.143 This would in most cases be the 
New York Convention, which led the Court to the conclusion that the question asked by 
the Supreme Court of Lithuania was to be answered in the negative. This meant that the 
Regulation did not have an impact on the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award containing an anti-suit injunction.144 
 This result had already been predicted before the judgment was given145 and was 
approved of commentators afterwards.146 If the West Tankers judgment had not been 
given before, the case may not even have made its way to the CJEU, because most like-
ly no confusion with regards to the applicable instruments to judgments and awards 
would have arisen. No one would have assumed that the Brussels Regime could inter-
fere with an arbitral award, regardless of its content. Only once the problem of anti-suit 
injunctions issued by national courts had arisen, people were tempted to adapt the given 
arguments to anti-suit injunctions rendered by arbitral tribunals and thereby forgetting 
that the reasoning of the CJEU in West Tankers required at least the possibility of apply-
ing the Brussels I Regulation, whereas arbitral awards are governed by national proce-
dural law and international law. Under the recast Regulation, this has even been further 
underlined, as Art. 73(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation now explicitly states that the ap-
plication of the New York Convention shall not be affected by the Regulation.147 More-
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over, Recital 12(3) in its last sentence also provides for the prevalence of the New York 
Convention. Accordingly, anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitral tribunals do not come 
within the scope of the Brussels Ia Regulation. 
III. Proceedings ancillary to arbitration 
 Once the arbitration agreement has been validated, the arbitral tribunal can be 
constituted. If one party does not abide by the agreement and refuses to take part in this 
process, other instances will have to substitute them in this regard. In most cases, the 
arbitration agreement contains a reference to an arbitral institution and its rules, which 
usually provide that the arbitral institution carries out ancillary measures in support of 
the arbitral proceedings.148 Such measures include the appointment of and the challenge 
to an arbitrator, the determination of the arbitral seat or the extension of a time limit. 
But where such a reference to applicable arbitral rules is missing, a further option exists, 
as in these cases national courts may lend support. 
 Hereinabove, it already becomes apparent that these proceedings may not be 
governed by the Brussels Regime. The named measures are very closely linked to the 
arbitral proceeding itself, and often they are already contained in the arbitration agree-
ment, at least indirectly by referring to arbitral rules. If this is not the case, national arbi-
tration laws determine the applicable procedure. 
 This was stated in the Reports to the Brussels Convention,149 confirmed by the 
CJEU in Marc Rich and Van Uden150 and is now made clear by Recital 12(4) of the 
Brussels Ia Regulation, which states that ‘[t]his Regulation should not apply to any ac-
tion or ancillary proceedings relating to, in particular, the establishment of an arbitral 
tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration procedure or any other 
aspects of such a procedure’.  
 Consequently, proceedings ancillary to arbitration undisputedly do not come 
within the scope of the Brussels Ia Regulation, and are therefore clearly subject to the 
national laws of the Member States. 
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IV. Provisional measures 
 Provisional measures may become necessary before the arbitral tribunal has 
been constituted, but most often during the arbitral procedure itself. They can take vari-
ous forms under different laws,151 but within the context of the Brussels Regime (as 
well as arbitration), they foremost serve the goal ‘to preserve a factual or legal situation 
so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is otherwise sought from the court [or 
tribunal] having jurisdiction as to the substance of the case’.152 The different versions of 
the Brussels Regime have never contained a concrete definition of provisional 
measures,153 however the Brussels Ia Regulation has now introduced Recital 25, which 
seems to explain that the main feature of provisional measures under the Brussels Ia 
Regulation is their protective nature.154 
 In most cases, national courts and arbitral tribunals both have the power to issue 
provisional measures. One could assume that before the arbitral tribunal has been con-
stituted, only national courts can be seized in this regard. But many arbitral rules pro-
vide for the possibility to appoint a so-called ‘emergency arbitrator’ having jurisdiction 
to order provisional measures.155 Nevertheless, there are some disadvantages to provi-
sional measures ordered by emergency arbitrators, for example problems with their in-
ternational enforcement, because some national arbitration laws do not contain specific 
provisions for the enforcement of such orders, so that parties may still prefer to rely on 
national courts.156 Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, there may at first sight 
not remain any reason to involve national courts. However, as the arbitral process is 
based on the autonomy of the involved parties, the power of the tribunal, for example 
regarding orders involving third parties (e.g. the order for temporary freezing of a bank 
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account) or without giving notice to the party against whom the measure is directed (ex 
parte application), is limited.157 Therefore, national courts are important in order to issue 
provisional measures even if the arbitral tribunal has already been constituted. 
1. By a national court 
 First of all, the question arises if national courts have the power to issue provi-
sional measures in support of arbitration. If the arbitration agreement confers the juris-
diction to decide any disputes in relation to the matters defined therein to the arbitral 
tribunal, how can judges have jurisdiction to decide (parts of) the case in a provisional 
ruling? The New York Convention does not deal expressly with provisional relief,158 
whereas the European Convention provides that ‘[a] request for interim measures or 
measures of conservation addressed to a judicial authority shall not be deemed incom-
patible with the arbitration agreement’.159 The answer is therefore mainly to be found in 
the national arbitration laws160 and also in the applicable arbitration rules161, which in 
most cases contain similar provisions.162 Thus, the question raised can be seen as histor-
ically grown as these provisions have not always existed.163 Nevertheless, depending on 
the constellation of the case, the decision regarding the provisional measure could even 
prejudice the result of the arbitration.164 Therefore, judges should exercise caution when 
issuing provisional measures, even though they mostly have the power to do so. 
 Nevertheless, the question remains whether or not provisional measures ordered 
by a national court in support of arbitration come within the scope of the Brussels Re-
gime. 
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 The different Reports on the Brussels Convention did not yet specifically ad-
dress this matter, but of course referred to provisional measures in general as they were 
already then subject to a specific provision on jurisdiction.165 
 The CJEU dealt with the interaction between the article on provisional measures 
and arbitration in the Van Uden case.166 Van Uden, a Dutch company, was seeking pro-
visional measures relating to the payment of debts from Deco-Line, a German company, 
arising under a contract containing an arbitration clause in front of the Dutch courts. 
The Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court) asked the CJEU inter alia to rule on 
the relevance of the fact that the dispute in question was subject to arbitration. The 
Court first stated that in the presence of an arbitration agreement, the jurisdiction of a 
court could only be based on the Convention's rule on provisional measures,167 as the 
agreement to arbitrate per se excluded the jurisdiction of any court as to the substance of 
the case.168 But regarding the Convention’s rule on provisional measures, the Court had 
already stated that if a matter was excluded from the Convention according to Art. 1(2), 
provisional measures in that case would be excluded as well.169 As arbitration was ex-
cluded from the scope of the Convention,170 one would have assumed that the same rea-
soning would have applied in Van Uden. But the Court identified provisional measures 
in support of arbitration as not being ancillary to arbitration171 but rather parallel to it, 
and therefore that reference had to be made to the nature of the rights that the provision-
al measures served to protect.172 In the case before the Court, the provisional measure 
was not aimed at protecting the arbitral proceedings, but rather to secure the perfor-
mance of a contractual obligation. Thus, the rule on provisional measures of the Brus-
sels Convention was applicable.173 The difference of arbitration being excluded from 
the scope of the Brussels Regime to the other exceptions listed in Art. 1(2) is that it re-
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lates to a chosen procedure instead of areas of material law, so that the earlier reasoning 
of the Court with regards to the latter did not apply in the same way.174 
 Regarding this outcome, the reactions of commentators were in parts assent-
ing,175 but for some of them, the differentiation between ‘proceedings ancillary to arbi-
tration’ and ‘parallel proceedings in support of arbitration’ was not clear enough, be-
cause for example provisional measures indeed supporting the arbitral process and at the 
same time being provisional, such as provisional measures to submit evidence, would 
be hard to assign to only one of these categories.176  
 Soon thereafter, when the Brussels Convention was converted into the Brussels I 
Regulation, a proposal to change the provision on provisional measures was dis-
cussed,177 but in the end the status quo remained.178  
 In the Brussels I review process, the Heidelberg Report discussed the influence 
of arbitration agreements on the power of national courts to order provisional measures 
again, providing for two alternatives. 
First, if their proposal to include arbitration into the scope of the Regulation was being 
followed, they concluded that  
‘provisional measures of national courts supporting arbitration proceedings 
would not only fall under Article 31 [of the Brussels I Regulation], but could al-
so be granted by all courts of the Member States under the heads of jurisdiction 
provided for in Articles 2-26 [of the Brussels I Regulation]’.179  
 Nevertheless, this would not have solved the uncertainty as regards the distinc-
tion between ‘ancillary’ and ‘parallel proceedings in support’ introduced by the Van 
Uden judgment, because the proposed exclusive jurisdiction of the court at the place of 
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arbitration would have only referred to ancillary proceedings,180 leaving it open what 
would happen with the so determined parallel proceedings in support of arbitration. 
From the statement above, one could derive that any court having jurisdiction either in 
accordance with Art. 2-26 Brussels I Regulation or in accordance with Art. 31 Brussels 
I Regulation would have the power to order provisional measures, regardless of them 
being ancillary or not. The provision providing for exclusive jurisdiction at the seat of 
arbitration would after this interpretation only have applied to ancillary proceedings not 
being of a provisional nature, such as the appointment of an arbitrator. 
 Second, if the proposal to delete Art. 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I Regulation was 
not to be followed, the authors alternatively proposed that the exception of arbitration in 
Art. 1 should be supplemented by an exception to the exception regarding ‘provisional 
measures not affected, under the law of the Member State, by an arbitration agree-
ment’.181  
 As previously stated, the Green Paper then followed the first approach of bring-
ing arbitration within the scope of the Brussels Ia Regulation, and would therefore have 
led to the same results.182  
 The following Commission’s Proposal again adopted a different approach in this 
regard. While the exclusive jurisdiction for the courts at the seat of arbitration would 
have only applied with regards to the scrutiny of the arbitration agreement, a new Art. 
36 would have given jurisdiction to any court of a Member State as available under its 
national law regarding provisional measures, ‘even if the courts of another Member 
State or an arbitral tribunal have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter’.183 In this 
case, any national court would have been able to order provisional measures in support 
of arbitration if its national law provided so. 
 In the further review process, these ideas have been discarded. In the final ver-
sion of the Brussels Ia Regulation, the main change regarding arbitration was the intro-
duction of Recital 12. Regarding provisional measures, the rule on provisional 
measures184 has experienced only very slight changes that seem not to affect provisional 
measures ordered by national courts in support of arbitration. Recital 12 could in any 
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case only refer to provisional measures in its paragraph 4, stating that ‘[t]his Regulation 
should not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings relating to, in particular, the es-
tablishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitra-
tion procedure or any other aspects of such a procedure […]’. The only link to provi-
sional measures in this wording could be the mentioning of ‘ancillary proceedings’. But 
as the CJEU in Van Uden has specifically differentiated provisional measures from an-
cillary proceedings, and as they are not mentioned in the (non-exhaustive) listing of 
examples despite the review process having dealt with the issue and therefore obviously 
being well aware of it, it seems to be far-fetched to interpret this wording as including 
provisional measures. 
 Thus, in conclusion the principle set out by the CJEU in Van Uden still claims 
validity under the Brussels Ia Regulation.185 For the sake of clarity, this does not mean 
that the Brussels Ia Regulation applies in its entirety. Only the Brussels Ia Regulation’s 
rule on provisional measures186 can constitute jurisdiction for national courts ordering 
provisional measures in support of arbitration, provided the rights the provisional 
measures serve to protect come within its scope. Nevertheless, national courts seem to 
exercise caution when ordering provisional measures in support of arbitral proceedings 
seated in a different state, because their laws are often ‘foreign’ to the chosen law of the 
arbitration.187 
2. By an arbitral tribunal 
 Despite the powers of national courts to order provisional measures based on 
their sovereignty, the parties to an arbitration agreement have in principle conferred the 
power to decide any disputes arising within its scope to the arbitral tribunal. Indeed, the 
main sources of law regarding the arbitrator’s power to order provisional measures are 
to be seen in the arbitration agreement and the national laws, as international arbitration 
conventions rarely deal with the matter.188 In practice, arbitrators seem to exercise rela-
tively frequently the broad powers conferred to them by these sources.189  
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 Contrary to the above, a source of law regarding the jurisdiction for and the en-
forcement of provisional measures ordered by arbitrators cannot be seen in the Brussels 
Regime. The reason for this is simple: preliminary proceedings conducted by arbitral 
tribunals are still arbitral proceedings, and those were from the beginning excluded from 
the Brussels Regime. The different review and recast processes have changed nothing in 
this regard. Problems related to the arbitration exclusion in the Brussels Regime almost 
always arose only regarding court proceedings in support of arbitration, not regarding 
arbitration proceedings themselves.190 As with anti-suit injunctions ordered by arbitral 
tribunals, it is only the stage of the enforcement of the provisional measures (in the form 
of an (provisional) award), where national courts enter the scene.191 Therefore, provi-
sional measures ordered by arbitral tribunals do not come within the scope of the Brus-
sels Ia Regulation. 
V.  Annulment of the award 
 If the loosing party is not satisfied with the award, it will usually try to have it 
annulled by a national court.192 Even though the arbitral award is deemed to be final, 
different legal instruments provide limited grounds for its challenge. 
 The New York Convention, as the main instrument dealing with arbitral awards, 
states in Art. V(1)(e) that  
‘[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award may be refused […] if [a] party fur-
nishes to the competent authority proof that [t]he award […] has been set aside 
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law 
of which, that award was made’. 
 Together with Art. VI of the New York Convention, which refers to Art. 
V(1)(e), it is generally accepted that the courts of the place of arbitration have exclusive 
jurisdiction for annulment proceedings.193 Substantive grounds for the annulment of an 
arbitral award are in contrary to that not contained in the New York Convention.194 
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 The European Convention is a little more specific, as it provides under Art. 
IX(1) that a judgment setting aside an award is not a basis for the refusal of recognition 
of the award if it refers to a substantive review of the merits of the award or local public 
policy.195 Regarding the substantive grounds for the setting aside of an arbitral award, 
reference has however to be made to the national law of the seat of arbitration. In most 
cases, these grounds resemble strongly the ones set out by Art. V of the New York 
Convention concerning the refusal to recognise or enforce an arbitral award.196 The 
same applies regarding the UNCITRAL Model Law.197 
 It can be deduced that recourse against the award shall only be possible under 
very limited circumstances, which has been confirmed by the CJEU.198 If successful, the 
annulment of the award certainly results in the unenforceability in the state of its origin, 
whereas the consequences regarding its possible enforcement elsewhere strongly de-
pend on the specific forum where enforcement is sought. The reason for this is to be 
seen in Art. V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, which only states that recognition 
and enforcement ‘may’ be refused on this ground, and thereby leading to differing in-
terpretations by national courts.199 But in the vast majority of cases, the annulment of 
the award will result in its unenforceability internationally. 
 One can assume from this introduction that annulment proceedings do not come 
within the scope of the Brussels Regime, as they are at least in parts subject to the New 
York Convention. This was stated by all the Reports on the Brussels Convention,200 
reiterated by the CJEU201 and is now explicitly laid down in Recital 12(4) of the Brus-
sels Ia Regulation, stating that ‘[t]his Regulation should not apply to […] any action or 
judgment concerning the annulment […] of an arbitral award’. Therefore, the variety of 
national arbitration laws within the European Union governs this issue.  
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VI. Recognition and enforcement of the award 
 After the arbitral tribunal has finished the proceedings and the award has been 
rendered, most parties seem to comply with the result voluntarily.202 If they refuse to do 
so, the enforcement of the award becomes necessary. If the unsuccessful party alterna-
tively tries to escape the outcome of the arbitral proceedings and issues a claim in a na-
tional court regarding the same subject matter, the prevailing party will seek for recog-
nition of the award in order to bar these court proceedings. In both situations, the sup-
port of national courts is needed. As the full title of the New York Convention indicates, 
it is this legal instrument that governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbi-
tration awards. 
 Therefore, these proceedings also do not come within the scope of the Brussels 
Regime.203 The Reports were clear on this point204 and the CJEU left no doubt in this 
regard either.205 In line with this, Recital 12(4) of the Brussels Ia Regulation further 
clarifies the issue, stating that ‘[t]his Regulation should not apply to […] any action or 
judgment concerning the […] recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award’. In re-
sult, this again leads to the national arbitration laws incorporating the New York Con-
vention being applicable to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and not 
the Brussels Regime. 
VII. Interim Conclusion 
 At this point, subquestion one about the arbitration-related matters that are cov-
ered by Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation and therefore excluded from its scope of 
application can be answered by drawing an interim conclusion. 
 First, the answer regarding the challenge to the validity of the arbitration agree-
ment depends on whether this question is the main subject matter of the case or not. If it 
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is, the Regulation is not applicable in line with Recital 12(2). If it is not, but rather a 
preliminary question, one has to distinguish once more. In the case of the court finding 
the arbitration agreement valid and referring the parties to arbitration, the Regulation is 
also not applicable for the same reason. In the case of the court finding the arbitration 
agreement to be invalid and therefore giving a judgment on the substance of the case, 
the Regulation is in line with Recital 12(3) applicable to the judgment on the merits. 
Nevertheless, the incidental decision on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement is in 
line with Recital 12(2) still subject to the exception set out in Art. 1(2)(d) of the Brus-
sels Ia Regulation regarding its recognition and enforcement. 
 Second, the answer regarding anti-suit injunctions in support of arbitration de-
pends on the instance issuing them. If it is an arbitral tribunal issuing the injunction, the 
Regulation could from the outset only apply to the enforcement of the award containing 
the injunction. But in line with Recital 12(4), the Regulation does not apply to actions or 
judgments concerning the enforcement of an arbitral award. Therefore, they are subject 
to Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation. If it is a national court issuing the anti-suit in-
junction in support of arbitration, these proceedings themselves do not come within the 
scope of the Regulation because they serve to protect the right to determine the dispute 
by arbitration. Consequently, they would be covered by Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia Regula-
tion. Nevertheless, anti-suit injunctions issued by an English court against the court of a 
Member State – whether in support of arbitration or not – infringe the principle of mu-
tual trust and are therefore not permitted. 
 Third, proceedings ancillary to arbitration are covered by Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia 
Regulation and therefore excluded from its scope of application in line with Recital 
12(4). 
 Fourth, the answer regarding provisional measures in support of arbitration again 
depends on the instance ordering them. If it is an arbitral tribunal ordering the provi-
sional measure, the same reasoning as for anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitral tribu-
nals applies. Therefore, they are subject to Art. 1(2)(d) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, 
and thus outside the scope of the Regulation. If it is a national court of a Member State 
ordering the provisional measure, these proceedings do come within the scope of the 
Brussels Ia Regulation as long as the rights the provisional measures serve to protect 
come within its scope. The reason why they are not covered by Art. 1(2)(d) of the 
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Brussles Ia Regulation is that these proceedings are not concerned with arbitration itself, 
but rather only with the rights that are finally to be determined by arbitration. 
 Fifth, actions or judgments concerning the annulment of an award are also cov-
ered by Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation and therefore excluded from its scope of 
application in line with Recital 12(4). 
 Sixth, the same applies as regards actions or judgments concerning the recogni-
tion or enforcement of an arbitral award. 
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C. Remaining problems 
 On the basis of these results, the remaining legal problems can be discussed in 
order to examine the second subquestion of this minor dissertation. 
I. Parallel proceedings 
 Problems at the intersection of court and arbitral proceedings in the EU result 
mainly from the fact that before and after the recast of the Brussels I Regulation, the 
legal framework in this field of law does not prevent parallel court and arbitral proceed-
ings on the merits. The reason for this shortcoming is a jurisdictional overlap of national 
courts and arbitral tribunals based on the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz.206 Where 
each judicial body has the power to decide on its own jurisdiction, the danger of diverg-
ing outcomes automatically emerges. The variety of approaches with regards to the law 
applicable to the validity of the arbitration agreement further increases this risk.207 
 That the Brussels Ia Regulation has changed nothing in this regard can be illus-
trated by its application to the Marc Rich case.208 The decision of the Italian courts on 
the merits of the case would still have to be recognized and enforced in accordance with 
the Brussels Ia Regulation (Recital 12(3)), but at the same time would still not have 
prevented the English courts from deciding differently with regards to the preliminary 
question of the validity of the arbitration agreement (Recital 12(2)). Therefore, the latter 
could still be supporting arbitral proceedings commenced in England. The result would 
again be the danger of the Italian courts and an English arbitral tribunal deciding both 
on the merits of the case. 
II. Enforcement of contradicting legal titles 
 Parallel proceedings may lead to contradicting legal titles, and each party will 
most likely seek to enforce the one in its favour. The question is therefore which of the 
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legal titles should prevail. Several different constellations need to be distinguished in 
this regard. 
 In general, both the Brussels Ia Regulation and the New York Convention pro-
vide different grounds for refusal of enforcement of judgments or awards respective-
ly.209 In the case of contradicting legal titles, several grounds of both instruments may 
come into question. Besides the grounds provided in these two legal instruments, addi-
tional grounds for refusal of the actual enforcement as available under the national law 
of the Member State addressed may be applicable.210  
 Regarding Member State judgments, the Brussels Ia Regulation contains two 
specific provisions for the refusal of enforcement of irreconcilable judgments:211 one for 
irreconcilable judgments of courts of the Member State addressed (art. 45(1)(c) Brussels 
Ia Regulation)212 and one for irreconcilable judgments of courts of another Member 
State or third States (Art. 45(1)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation)213. Besides that, Art. 45(1)(a) 
Brussels Ia Regulation214 could provide a further ground for refusal of enforcement of a 
judgment contradicting an award, referring to an infringement of public policy. Under 
the Brussels Ia Regulation, there is no longer a need to grant leave to enforce judgments 
as exequatur was abolished, so that the judgment is directly enforceable if the debtor 
does not introduce proceedings for non-enforcement.215 While the Brussels I Regulation 
provided for an exequatur procedure in two stages – one for the declaration of enforcea-
bility in the Member State addressed and one for the challenge of the same – the Brus-
sels Ia Regulation has put an end to the first stage and has only retained the challenge 
stage.216 It is at this (formerly) second stage, where a party may invoke the grounds set 
out by Art. 46, 45 Brussels Ia Regulation. Those grounds therefore relate to the enforce-
ability of a Member State judgment and cannot be considered by the Member State 
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court addressed on its own motion.217 A distinction in this regard must be drawn to the 
actual enforcement. While the enforceability relates to the grounds set out in Art. 45 
Brussels Ia Regulation, the enforcement itself is subject to the national procedural law 
of the Member State addressed.218 Therefore, the grounds for refusal of the actual en-
forcement of judgments would vary from Member State to Member State, which is why 
they are not considered in this work. Consequently, the party seeking for enforcement of 
a judgment will have to apply in each Member State separately.219 Moreover, the en-
forceability of a judgment in the Member State of origin is a prerequisite for its en-
forcement in the Member State where enforcement is sought.220 
 Regarding arbitral awards, two grounds provided in Art. V of the New York 
convention could potentially serve as a ground for refusal of an arbitral award that is 
contradicting a Member State judgment. First, Art. V(1)(a) New York Convention could 
constitute such a ground, if the court addressed finds the arbitration agreement to be 
invalid.221 Second, the New York Convention refers in Art. V(2)(b) also to an infringe-
ment of the public policy in the country addressed.222 The difference between these two 
grounds is that one of the parties needs to request the refusal of enforcement on the 
ground of Art. V(1)(a), while the court can refer to Art. V(2)(b) on its own motion.223 
Under the New York Convention, the party seeking the enforcement of the arbitral 
award would in general have to apply for a granting of leave to enforce the arbitral 
award in the Member State addressed.224 The enforcement procedure itself would then 
again be subject to the national procedural law of the state of enforcement. 
 The UNCITRAL Model Law has adopted Art. V New York Convention with 
minor drafting changes in its Art. 36.225 Consequently, in states that have adopted the 
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Model Law, the provisions based on Art. 36(1)(a)(i) and Art. 36(1)(b)(ii) may serve as 
examples of national statutes dealing with the enforcement of arbitral awards. As there 
may be significant differences between other national legislations that would have to be 
considered individually,226 they are also not subject of this work. 
 The following scenarios are based on the assumption that the Member State 
court addressed is not a court at the seat of arbitration, so that the New York Convention 
is applicable.227 Besides that, it is assumed that the state of any kind of court proceed-
ings is a Member State of the EU. 
1. Possibility of enforcement of the award in the state of the parallel 
court proceedings 
 In the state of the parallel court proceedings, the award would only have a 
chance to be enforced under the New York Convention prior to a decision of this court 
on the validity of the arbitration agreement.228 Once the court in this state has found the 
arbitration agreement to be invalid, recognition and enforcement of the award would 
most likely be refused on the ground of Art. V(1)(a) New York Convention at the re-
quest of the party against whom the award is invoked. As a last resort, the courts in the 
state of the parallel proceedings may also refer to public policy in accordance with Art. 
V(2)(b) New York Convention on their own motion.229 Even though the provision is to 
be interpreted narrowly,230 the courts will try to evade undermining the judgment of its 
own courts at all cost. In regard to a possible enforcement of the award in the state of 
the parallel court proceedings, the party being able to reach a decision on the validity of 
the arbitration agreement first clearly has an advantage. 
 It is only the state of the parallel court proceedings in which the court judgment 
is a national judgment and therefore not subject to the Brussels Ia Regulation (but rather 
only subject to the national procedural law). Consequently, this state is unique regarding 
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the enforcement of the contradicting legal titles.231 Therefore, for the following scenari-
os it can be assumed that the state of enforcement is any Member State but the state of 
the parallel court proceedings.  
2. Parallel existence of contradicting arbitral award and court judgment 
at the same time without any of them being enforced yet 
 In the next scenario, the court judgment and the arbitral award are merely exist-
ent at the same time, without any of them being enforced yet. It is assumed that the par-
ties to the dispute then try concurrently in the same Member State to enforce the legal 
title in their favour.  
 A clarification in the Brussels Ia Regulation for this constellation results from 
Art. 73(2) Brussels Ia Regulation and the last part of Recital 12(3): As stated before, 
national courts of Member States have to recognise and enforce judgments on the merits 
after a court in an other Member State has found an arbitration agreement to be invalid 
in accordance with sentence 1 of Recital 12(3). The second sentence however states that 
this should be without prejudice to the application of the New York Convention by the-
se courts, which is taking precedence over the Regulation. The clarification resulting 
therefrom can be illustrated by the following example.  
 A court in Member State A is confronted with a request to enforce the judgment 
on the merits of a court in Member State B in accordance with Art. 36 and subsequent 
of the Brussels Ia Regulation. The court in Member State B incidentally found an arbi-
tration agreement to be invalid. At the same time, the court in Member State A is re-
quested to enforce an arbitral award on the same subject matter. This award exists be-
cause the arbitral tribunal or any other national court supporting the arbitral proceedings 
found the arbitration agreement to be valid. Even though the court in Member State A 
would normally have to enforce the judgment of the court in Member State B in accord-
ance with the Brussels Ia Regulation, this does not prevent it from applying the New 
York Convention. If the court in Member State A finds the arbitral award to be enforce-
                                                            
231  Even though Recital 26 states in its last sentence that ‘a judgment given by the courts of a Mem-
ber State should be treated as if it had been given in the Member State addressed’, there are lim-
ited grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement set out in Art. 46, 45 of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation that can only apply to judgments from Member States other than the Member State 
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able under the New York Convention, this result would prevail over its obligation to 
enforce the judgment of the court in Member State B.232 
 Notwithstanding this, the court in Member State A could possibly refuse the 
enforcement of the award on its own motion on the ground of a violation of its public 
policy according to Art. V(2)(b) New York Convention because the award is contradic-
tory to the judgment of the court in Member State B and therefore violates the principle 
of res judicata.233 
 In my opinion, a reason to not refer to this reasoning could be seen in the last 
part of Recital 12(3): If the obligation to enforce the judgment of the court in Member 
State B in accordance with the Brussels Ia Regulation should be without prejudice to 
apply the New York Convention, what would be the underlying reason of the last sen-
tence of Recital 12(3) if this obligation would constitute a breach of public policy pur-
suant to Art. V(2)(b) of the thereafter applicable New York Convention? Such an inter-
pretation would be circular according to my understanding. Therefore, in the given situ-
ation the award should be enforced if no other grounds of refusal are given. 
 A potential ground for refusing to recognise and enforce the arbitral award could 
be Art. V(1)(a) New York Convention, if one of the parties makes such a request. The 
outcome in this regard would depend on whether or not the seized Member State court 
attributes a preclusive effect to the positive jurisdictional decision of the arbitral tribu-
nal.234 If it does so, the enforcement of the award would prevail. If it does not attribute a 
preclusive effect to the arbitral tribunal’s finding, it would scrutinise the arbitration 
agreement anew. Assuming that the party initiating the court proceedings has done so in 
bad faith, the outcome would most likely be the same.  
 Consequently, in a situation where a court is confronted with concurrent applica-
tions to enforce an award and a judgment that are contradicting, it would have to apply 
the New York Convention and enforce the award if no ground for refusal is present. 
This finding is based on Art. 73(2) Brussels Ia Regulation and the last sentence of Re-
cital 12(3) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, which states that the New York Convention 
takes precedence over the Regulation. 
                                                            
232  In the same sense Hartley op cit (n76) 865 subs; Hauberg Wilhelmsen op cit (n57) 125; Auda op 
cit (n93) 127. 
233  Hauberg Wilhelmsen op cit (n4) 184. 
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 Nevertheless, timing plays a major role in this scenario as well because it is 
based on the assumption that both legal titles are existent at the same time, so that the 
application for their enforcement can be made at the same time. 
3. Existence of one legal title before the other 
 Regarding the situation where one of the legal titles exists before the other, two 
further scenarios have to be distinguished: First, the situation in which the Member 
State court judgment is given before the arbitral award, and second, the contrary situa-
tion in which the arbitral award is rendered before the Member State court judgment. 
a) Judgment existent, award not 
 
 In the first scenario, the arbitral proceedings are not yet concluded, but the 
Member State court has already decided on the merits of the case. If the prevailing party 
seeks to enforce the judgment in the courts of a different Member State, this court 
would have to do so in accordance with Chapter III of the Brussels Ia Regulation. The 
grounds for refusal of enforcement set out in Art. 46, 45 Brussels Ia Regulation do not 
refer to parallel arbitral proceedings. In result, the judgment would therefore prevail, at 
least until the award is made.235 
b) Award existent, judgment not 
 
 In the second scenario, the arbitral award is already rendered whereas the court 
proceedings are still going on. If the prevailing party applies in this scenario for the en-
forcement of the award, any Member State court will be obliged to declare it enforcea-
ble in accordance with Art. III – V of the New York Convention.236 The mere existence 
of parallel court proceedings in a different Member State court does not affect this obli-
gation and also does not constitute a ground for refusal of enforcement after Art. V of 
the New York Convention. A possibility in this situation would be Art. V(1)(a) of the 
New York Convention if the court of enforcement would find the arbitration agreement 
                                                            
235  In the same sense for Germany and the scenario that also the arbitral award is already existent P 
Mankowski ‘Kann ein Schiedsspruch ein Hindernis für die Anerkennung einer ausländischen 
Entscheidung sein?’ (2014) 5 SchiedsVZ 214; arguing for an end of the arbitral proceedings 
based on the principle of res judicata in this situation Hartley op cit (n76) 865. 
236  In the same way Hartley op cit (n76) 865. 
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to be invalid as well. In this regard, the situation is not different to the situation where 
both titles are already existent but not enforced yet.237 
 Therefore, the party being able to reach a final decision in the proceedings pur-
sued by it first has also in the scenario of one legal title being existent before the other 
an advantage over its opponent.  
4. Both legal titles existent, one of them already enforced 
 Once one of the legal titles has already been enforced, it is clearly in the interest 
of legal certainty to not permit the enforcement of the contradicting second legal title as 
well. The main question in this situation is on which legal ground the refusal to enforce 
the latter title could be based. In this regard, one can differentiate between the attempt 
of enforcement in the same forum where the first legal title has already been enforced 
and the attempt of enforcement in a different state. Within those scenarios, it has again 
to be distinguished between the arbitral award already being enforced and the court 
judgment already being enforced. 
a) Enforcement in the same state 
 
 If enforcement is sought in the state where a contradictory title has already been 
enforced, there are in fact almost no chances to succeed. 
i. Judgment already enforced, later application for enforcement of the 
award 
 
 If the judgment has already been enforced, the attempt to enforce a contradictory 
award afterwards would be denied on the basis of either Art. V(1)(a) or Art. V(2)(b) 
New York Convention.  
 Art. V(1)(a) of the New York Convention would not mandatorily be a ground 
for refusal of enforcement of the award, because the enforcement of the Member State 
court judgment on the merits has not necessarily affirmed its incidental decision on the 
invalidity of the arbitration agreement of the issuing court, but only its decision on the 
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merits of the case.238 If the refusal on the basis of Art. V(1)(a) New York Convention is 
requested by a party, the court of enforcement may therefore decide on its own whether 
it finds the arbitration agreement to be invalid or not. 
 Even if it would find the arbitration agreement to be valid and refuse to apply 
Art. V(1)(a) of the New York Convention, it would most likely apply Art. V(2)(b) of 
the New York Convention in order to avoid undermining the earlier enforcement of the 
judgment on the merits in the same forum.239 
ii. Award already enforced, later application for enforcement of the 
judgment 
 
 If the award is already enforced in the state where an application is made to en-
force the later judgment of another Member State court, several options to deny the en-
forceability of the judgment can be considered.  
 Firstly, Arts. 46, 45(1)(a) Brussels Ia Regulation could provide a ground for re-
fusal of enforcement of the Member State judgment based on its recognition being 
‘manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member State addressed’. The 
settled case law of the CJEU concerning the interpretation of this provision is that it 
must be interpreted strictly and that the limits of the concept are a matter of interpreta-
tion of the Regulation.240 The wording ‘manifestly’ already implies this strict line of 
interpretation. The ground can in principle be pleaded together with other grounds pro-
vided in Art. 45(1) Brussels Ia Regulation.241 Regarding its potential application to the 
refusal of enforcement of a Member State judgment in the state where a contradicting 
award has already been enforced, one may refer to different connecting factors. It has 
been stated that a manifest disregard of a valid arbitration agreement could constitute a 
ground for refusal of enforcement according to Arts. 46, 45(1)(a) Brussels Ia Regula-
tion.242Alternatively, it has been argued that reference to the provision may be made at 
least where the contradictory award has the effect of res judicata according to national 
law.243 The first reasoning seems to overlook the second sentence of Art. 45(3) Brussels 
                                                            
238  See Recital 12(2), (3) first sentence. 
239  In the same sense Mankowski op cit (n235) 214. 
240  Trade Agency Ltd v. Seramico Investments Ltd (2012) Case No. C-619/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:531 
at para 48 subs; regarding the predecessor Art 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation and referring to 
earlier decisions of the CJEU. 
241  J Fitchen op cit (n211) para 13.278. 
242  Illmer op cit (n93) para 2.66, with further references. 
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Ia Regulation, which states that ‘[t]he test of public policy […] may not be applied to 
the rules relating to jurisdiction’. Even though the rules relating to jurisdiction in chap-
ter II themselves do not refer to arbitration agreements, applying the test of public poli-
cy because a court has declared jurisdiction in accordance to those provisions despite a 
valid arbitration agreement would constitute an indirect breach of Art. 45(3)(2) Brussels 
Ia Regulation. Already the Jenard Report had stated that ‘public policy is not to be used 
as a means of justifying a review of the jurisdiction of the court of origin [which] re-
flects the Committee’s desire to limit so far as possible the concept of public policy’.244 
This desire is still current.245 The limited role of the public policy test is also the reason 
why it is in general not to be applied in the situation of contradicting awards and judg-
ments. The irreconcilability of legal titles is already subject to Art. 45(1)(c), (d) Brus-
sels Ia Regulation. Other situations where the public policy test is applicable appear to 
be much more severe than the infringement of a valid arbitration agreement.246 There-
fore, Art. 45(1)(a) of the Brussels Ia Regulation is not a suitable ground for refusal of 
enforcement of a judgment contradictory to an already enforced arbitral award. 
 Secondly, a direct application of Arts. 46, 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ia Regulation 
referring to the Member State court judgment granting leave to enforce the arbitral 
award could hinder the enforceability of another Member State’s later court judgment 
on the merits. This way, the arbitral award could serve as a shield against the Member 
State court judgment if the enforcement of the contradicting legal titles is sought in the 
same state. The provision constitutes an unreserved precedence of the national deci-
sion,247 but is limited to judgments given in the Member State addressed. However, also 
this attempt poses difficulties. The judgment granting leave to enforce the arbitral award 
is clearly outside the scope of the Regulation, because its main subject matter is the en-
forcement of an arbitral award. This means that the procedure would have to be repeat-
ed in every state where enforcement of the court judgment is sought, but not that it can-
not constitute a ground for refusal in accordance with Art. 45(1)(c) Brussels Ia Regula-
tion. The application of this provision does not require a judgment within the Regula-
tion’s substantive scope.248 However, more importantly the judgment granting leave to 
enforce the arbitral award would have to qualify as a judgment in the sense of Art. 2(a) 
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of the Brussels Ia Regulation.249 The CJEU has ruled in this regard, that a judgment in 
this sense is only given where a ‘judicial body of a Contracting State [is] deciding on its 
own authority the issues between the parties’.250 While the specific procedural mecha-
nisms of the national arbitration laws of the Member State by which leave is granted to 
enforce foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention are not similar, they in 
general do not provide for a review on the substance of the case.251 Consequently, the 
court granting leave to enforce the arbitral award does not decide on its own authority 
the issues between the parties. A direct application of Arts. 46, 45(1)(c) of the Brussels 
Ia Regulation to the Member State court judgment granting leave to enforce the arbitral 
award is therefore out of the question because this judgment does not fulfil the require-
ments of Art. 2(a) of the Brussels Ia Regulation according to the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU.252 
 Thirdly, different views exist on whether an application by way of analogy of 
Arts. 46, 45(1)(c) of the Brussels I Regulation can constitute a ground for refusal of 
enforcement of the judgment in the state where the award has already been enforced.253 
The reason for the application by way of analogy would be that the award is not a 
judgment. But the prerequisites of an application by way of analogy would also have to 
be given, as the provision is only directly applicable to earlier court judgments and not 
to earlier arbitral awards. Under the German doctrine, these requirements would be a 
situation of comparable interests and a statutory gap that is not intended. Comparable 
interests may be given between court judgments and arbitral awards, because the latter 
are supposed to have the same effect as the first. A statutory gap is also apparent, as the 
situation of contradicting judgments and awards is not regulated. But when it comes to 
this gap not being intended, one may raise objections. The legislator has explicitly ex-
cluded arbitration from the scope of the Brussels Regime, because it deemed the New 
York Convention to deal with this issue sufficiently. The statutory gaps arising from 
this exclusion have been known at least when recasting the Brussels I Regulation, as the 
review process proves. This lack of regulatory measures may be based on the inability 
of the responsible bodies to find consensus. But it would be against the law adopted by 
                                                            
249  This is a requirement that Art 45(1)(c) and Art 45(1)(d) have in common, see Fitchen op cit 
(n211) para 13.344 subs. 
250  Solo Kleinmotoren v. Boch (1994) Case No. C-414/94, E.C.R. I-02237 at para 17. 
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them to ignore their decision to keep arbitration excluded from the Regulation by apply-
ing its provisions by way of analogy to the matter they have intentionally excluded. 
Moreover, the CJEU seems also to be sceptical of analogous applications of the grounds 
set out in Art. 45(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation.254 Consequently, an application of 
Arts. 46, 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ia Regulation by way of analogy cannot be the solu-
tion of the problem of diverging judgments and awards. 
 Fourthly, there is some discussion as to whether the last sentence of Recital 
12(3) has to be interpreted in a way giving general precedence to the arbitral award over 
a contradicting judgment.255  If yes, Art. 45(1)(a) or (d) Brussels Ia Regulation should 
be taken into account in order to give effect to this general precedence,256 or Recital 
12(3) should be treated as an additional ground for refusal in Art. 45 Brussels Ia Regu-
lation.257 However as shown above,258 Recital 12(3) Brussels Ia Regulation gives only 
precedence to the application of the New York Convention over the Brussels Ia Regula-
tion, not to the arbitral award over a contradicting judgment. Moreover, the foregoing 
examination has revealed that Art. 45 Brussels Ia Regulation does not really provide a 
solution for the situation of contradicting judgments and arbitral awards. 
 After all, a suitable ground for refusal of enforcement of a judgment being con-
tradictory to an arbitral award already enforced in the same forum does not exist.  
b) Enforcement in different forums 
 
 When enforcement of the contradicting title is later sought in a different Member 
State, the question arises if the already enforced title can constitute a ground for refusal 
of enforcement elsewhere in the EU. One may again distinguish between the judgment 
being enforced before the contradicting arbitral award and the award being enforced 
before the contradicting judgment. 
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i. Judgment already enforced, later application for enforcement of the 
award 
 
 If a court judgment of Member State A has already been enforced in Member 
State B, a court in Member State C would still be free to apply the New York Conven-
tion when it is facing an application for enforcement of a contradicting foreign arbitral 
award. The court in Member State C is not bound by the decision on the invalidity of 
the arbitration agreement of the court in Member State A. The reason for this is again 
Recital 12(2), (3) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. The question in this constellation is 
only whether or not the enforcement of the judgment in Member State B has some im-
plications on the application of grounds for refusal of enforcement of the contradicting 
arbitral award as set out in Art. V New York Convention in Member State C. 
 Regarding the application of Art. V(1)(a) of the New York Convention, nothing 
really changes in comparison to the enforcement in the same state.259 In a different state, 
the courts are also not bound by the incidental decision on the invalidity of the arbitra-
tion agreement of the courts in Member State A and can therefore decide on their own 
in this regard. 
 One may consider an application of Art. V(2)(b) of the New York Convention in 
order to refuse the enforcement of the arbitral award. The reason for this could be seen 
in an undesired contradiction within the EU disturbing the free circulation of judgments 
if the Member States do not consider a contradictory judgment of each other’s courts 
when being faced with the application to enforce an arbitral award. The CJEU has ruled 
that – while ‘it is in the interest of efficient arbitration proceedings that […] refusal to 
recognise [or enforce] an award should be possible only in exceptional circumstanc-
es’260 – it is also necessary to give effect to fundamental provisions of the TFEU, which 
‘may be regarded as a matter of public policy within the meaning of the New York 
Convention’.261 In the hierarchy of norms, the Brussels Ia Regulation and its provisions 
are located below the TFEU. But the Regulation is based on Art. 81(2)(a) TFEU, which 
could indicate that a possible infringement of the Regulation could also be seen as a 
matter of public policy within the meaning of the New York Convention. Nevertheless, 
given the first statement of the CJEU regarding the exceptional nature of grounds for 
refusal of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, the application of the public 
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policy test as set out by Art. V(2)(b) of the New York Convention in order to refuse the 
enforcement of a contradictory arbitral award in a Member State different from the one 
that has already enforced the judgment seems to be unlikely. The Member States of the 
EU remain individual legal entities, and as arbitration is not governed by a uniform Eu-
ropean Union instrument, they remain free to decide individually about the application 
to enforce an arbitral award. In contrary to the enforcement in the same forum,262 the 
courts in Member State C do not run counter to a judgment already enforced by their 
own courts. In the end, the scenario is not really different from the situation where the 
court judgment and the arbitral award are existent at the same time, without any of them 
being enforced yet.263 Therefore, the courts in Member State C have to apply the New 
York Convention and will enforce the award if no ground for refusal is present. 
ii. Award already enforced, later application for enforcement of the 
judgment 
 
 If the arbitral award is already enforced in Member State B, it may possibly 
serve as a shield against the enforcement of the judgment of Member State A in Mem-
ber State C where enforcement is sought, because the courts there are not bound by the 
incidental judgment on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement from Member State A 
pursuant to Recital 12(2) Brussels Ia Regulation.264 As long as none of the legal titles 
are enforced in Member State C, the situation there is again the same as the one where 
the court judgment and the arbitral award are existent at the same time, without any of 
them being enforced yet.265 Consequently, the arbitral award prevails in Member State 
C unless a ground for refusal of enforcement is given. Then, it is again the question on 
which legal ground the enforcement of the contradicting judgment from Member State 
A could be refused in Member State C. 
 Regarding the effect of the enforcement of the arbitral award in Member State C 
on the available grounds for refusal of enforcement of the contradicting judgment in this 
state, the scenario is the same as in the situation where the arbitral award has only been 
enforced in the same state and not also in a different one.266  
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 But regarding the earlier enforcement of the arbitral award in Member State B, a 
further ground for refusal of enforcement of the contradicting judgment in Member 
State C could be considered. Arts. 46, 45(1)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation inter alia apply 
when a foreign judgment that is produced for enforcement in the Member State ad-
dressed is irreconcilable with another foreign judgment already given in a Member State 
other than the Member State addressed.267 The requirements set out by the provision are 
stricter than the ones of Art. 45(1)(c) Brussels Ia Regulation, as its application is limited 
to judgments involving the same cause of action and the same parties.268 But as these 
restrictions are not given in the scenario in question, they are not causing the inapplica-
bility of Art. 45(1)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation. Therefore, the same two options as for 
Art. 45(1)(c) Brussels Ia Regulation regarding its application can be discussed.269 First, 
Art. 45(1)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation could be applied directly by referring to the judg-
ment granting leave to enforce the arbitral award in the different Member State. As this 
judgment does not come within the scope of the Brussels Ia Regulation,270 it would 
qualify as a judgment from a third state in this context, which only has an impact on the 
point of time from which it is deemed to fulfil the conditions for its recognition in the 
Member State addressed, but not on the applicability of the provision in general.271 But 
again, this judgment does not fulfil the requirements of a judgment in the sense of Art. 
2(a) Brussels Ia Regulation, so that a direct application of the provision is not possi-
ble.272  
 Second, Art. 45(1)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation could be applied by way of analogy 
referring to the contradicting arbitral award itself and thereby equating it with a judg-
ment from a different Member State or from a third State respectively.273 However, the 
arguments against an application by way of analogy of Art. 45(1)(c) Brussels Ia Regula-
tion274 are applicable in the same way regarding an application by way of analogy of 
Art. 45(1)(d) Brussels Ia Regulation.275 The stricter requirements of the provision may 
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further support this result. Consequently, when the award has already been enforced in a 
different Member State, there may be a few more options that can be considered regard-
ing a possible ground for refusal of enforcement of the contradicting judgment else-
where in the EU, but in result a suitable option is again not existent. 
III. Interim conclusion 
 After all, the examination of the different possible scenarios of enforcement of 
contradicting legal titles resulting from the failure to prevent parallel proceedings be-
tween national courts and arbitral tribunals has shown that the current legal framework 
is not sufficiently able to provide for acceptable solutions. The table below outlines this 
finding in a summarised form. 
1. In the Member State of the parallel court proceedings, the arbitral award would not be enforced on 
grounds of Art. V(1)(a) or Art. V(2)(b) New York Convention.  
In any other Mem-
ber State: 
Foreign judgment Foreign award Result 
existent enforced existent enforced 
2. (+) (-) (+) (-) Enforcement of award in accordance 
with NYC 
3. a) (+) (-) (-) (-) Enforcement of judgment in accord-
ance with Brussels Ia Regulation 
 b) (-) (-) (+) (-) Enforcement of award in accordance 
with NYC 
4.a) Enforce-
ment in the 
same forum 
i. (+) (+) (+) (-) No enforcement of the award based 
on Art. V(1)(a) or V(2)(b) NYC 
ii. (+) (-) (+) (+) No enforcement of the judgment; 
problem of ground for refusal in 
Brussels Ia Regulation: 
• Arts. 46, 45(1)(a)                   (-) 
• Arts. 46, 45(1)(c), direct appli-
cation by reference to judgment 
granting leave to enforce the ar-
bitral award                            (-)  
• Arts. 46, 45(1)(c), application 
by way of analogy to the arbi-
tral award                            (+/-) 
• General prevalence of arbitral 
award based on Art. 73(2), Re-
cital 12(3)                               (-) 
  





i. (+) (+) (+) (-) Enforcement of award in accordance 
with NYC 
ii. (+) (-) (+) (+) No enforcement of the judgment; 
problem of ground for refusal in 
Brussels Ia Regulation: 
− Regarding the effect of the en-
forcement of the award in the 
same forum: 
• Arts. 46, 45(1)(a)                   (-) 
• Arts. 46, 45(1)(c), direct appli-
cation by reference to judgment 
granting leave to enforce the ar-
bitral award                            (-)  
• Arts. 46, 45(1)(c), application 
by way of analogy to the arbi-
tral award                            (+/-) 
• General prevalence of arbitral 
award based on Art. 73(2), Re-
cital 12(3)                               (-) 
− Additionally regarding the effect 
of the enforcement of the award 
in a different forum: 
• Arts. 46, 45(1)(d), direct appli-
cation by reference to judgment 
granting leave to enforce the ar-
bitral award                            (-)  
• Arts. 46, 45(1)(c), application 
by way of analogy to the arbi-
tral award                            (+/-) 
 
 This contributes to the predicament that, on the one hand parallel proceedings 
remain possible under the Brussels Ia Regulation, while on the other hand no well de-
fined solution for the resulting problems regarding the enforcement of the possibly con-
tradicting legal titles is being provided. Until those shortcomings are eradicated, the best 
way to deal with the necessary refusal to enforce a contradictory judgment is an applica-
tion by way of analogy of Art. 45(1)(c), (d) Brussels Ia Regulation respectively, de-
pending on whether or not enforcement of the judgment is sought in the same Member 
State.  Even though the statutory gap can hardly be seen as unintended, a solution for 
the refusal of enforcement of the contradicting judgment is needed. Otherwise, the aim 
of legal certainty is put at stake. 
 The different scenarios outlined have also shown that timing plays an important 
role in the situation of parallel proceedings and potentially contradictory judgments. 
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The party first being able to reach a judgment or award on the merits has a clear ad-
vantage from that point of time. This encourages the parties to race to court litigation 
and arbitral proceedings.276 Moreover, it could potentially influence the quality of the 
arbitral proceedings in a negative way. Once the arbitrators know that they are under 
pressure to conclude the proceedings as early as possible, they are more likely to sacri-
fice high quality awards for fast results. 
 To answer the second subquestion of this minor thesis, it can be stated that the 
main legal problems resulting from the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of ap-
plicability of the Brussels Ia Regulation that remain are based on the possibility of par-
allel proceedings in front of Member State courts and arbitral tribunals. This can lead to 
possibly contradicting awards and judgments, which raises problems regarding the una-
vailability of grounds for the refusal of their enforcement. Accordingly, the party suc-
ceeding first has an advantage, so that a run to the courts and tribunals may emerge. 
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D. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, these shortcomings seem to stem from the unsuccessful process of 
enacting a European Union instrument providing a uniform law on arbitration. When 
the Member States of the EEC concluded on the Brussels Convention, they were aware 
that the New York Convention would not cover all parts of arbitration. Then as well as 
now, its scope is limited to the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements 
and arbitral awards. The founders of the Brussels Regime expected a uniform law on 
arbitration in the form of a European Convention to deal with all other parts related to 
arbitral proceedings. This way, a complete exclusion would have made sense. Instead, it 
is now a hotchpotch of national arbitration laws in the Member States dealing with these 
issues, because a uniform law on arbitration within the EU has never successfully been 
enacted. It is only for this reason that extensive and complicated jurisprudence of the 
CJEU was and is necessary in order to clarify the scope and meaning of the arbitration 
exclusion in the Brussels Regime.  
 In order to answer the research question of this minor dissertation, the legal con-
sequences resulting from the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of application of 
the Brussels Ia Regulation can be summarised as follows: 
 The dividing line between arbitration in the sense of the exclusion and the scope 
of application of the Brussels Ia Regulation is drawn by the case law of the CJEU. It 
runs in general along the main subject matter of the dispute, which is determined by the 
rights the proceedings serve to protect. If this is the right to determine the dispute by 
arbitration, the exclusion principally applies. Notwithstanding this, the CJEU has devel-
oped some exceptions to this rule, which are now at least in parts subject to Recital 12. 
 Where the exception applies, it is the national arbitration laws of the Member 
States governing jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of arbitration related judg-
ments. The national arbitration laws in the Member States are in turn often based on or 
referring to international conventions such as the New York Convention. If the excep-
tion does not apply, these matters are dealt with by the Brussels Ia Regulation. 
 The interpretation of the arbitration exclusion of the CJEU as set out by Recital 
12 has contributed to a certain degree of legal uncertainty, especially because parallel 
court litigation and arbitral proceedings remain possible under the Brussels Ia Regula-
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tion. This gives rise to further problems at the stage of enforcement, which contribute to 
a run to the courts and arbitral tribunals because in most cases the legal title that is is-
sued first prevails.  
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